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abstract. In Graham v. John Deere Co., the Supreme Court explained that patent law’s 
nonobviousness doctrine is meant to restrict the award of patents to only “those inventions 
which would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a patent.” This Article argues 
that this inducement standard, largely ignored in practice, should serve as the doctrinal polestar. 
Such an approach would provide a solid economic foundation for the patentability standard and 
would align patent law with the many other fields of regulatory law that currently apply 
economic analysis in determining the scope and content of regulation. The Article also offers 
several refinements to the inducement standard and explains how the Patent and Trademark 
Office and courts could implement the inducement standard in an administrable way. 
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The inherent problem was to develop some means of weeding out those 
inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a 
patent. 
  —A unanimous Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.1 
introduction 
The quotation above is one of the most memorable and insightful lines 
from arguably the most important patent law case of the twentieth century: the 
Supreme Court’s 1966 decision in Graham v. John Deere Co.2 Graham’s 
preeminent place in the patent canon is well justified, for it is the Supreme 
Court’s seminal opinion on a patent law doctrine—the “nonobviousness” 
requirement—that is typically introduced as “the most important of the basic 
patent requirements,”3 “central to determining patentability,”4 “the key to 
defining what is a patentable invention,”5 or simply “the ultimate condition of 
patentability.”6 The basic rule of nonobviousness is easy enough to recite: 
under 35 U.S.C. § 103, a patent may not be granted on an invention that 
“would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art.”7 But the apparent simplicity of the 
requirement belies the complexities and difficulties that have historically 
bedeviled the doctrine.8 The inducement standard, as articulated in Graham, 
 
1.  383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966). 
2.  383 U.S. 1. 
3.  ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 643 (3d ed. 2007). 
4.  Michael J. Meurer & Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Carrots and Sticks: A Model of 
Nonobviousness, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 547, 548 (2008). 
5.  Alan L. Durham, Patent Symmetry, 87 B.U. L. REV. 969, 970 (2007). 
6.  This phrase comes from the title of NONOBVIOUSNESS: THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF 
PATENTABILITY (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980), a prominent collection of articles 
celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the codification of the obviousness doctrine in 35 
U.S.C. § 103 (2006). Other authors have since used the same phrase to describe the 
doctrine. See, e.g., Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the Obviousness 
of Inventions, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 990 (2008). 
7.  35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
8.  See, e.g., Durham, supra note 5, at 971 (“Obviousness is a difficult issue to resolve. It requires 
one to imagine how a claimed invention might have looked to a different person . . . at a 
different time . . . and without resorting to hindsight based on knowledge of the claimed 
invention . . . .”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the 
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appears to be vitally important to understanding the statutory nonobviousness 
requirement, for it offers a simple explanation for why society should deny 
patents on some innovations: if the innovation would be created and disclosed 
even without patent protection, denying a patent on the innovation costs 
society nothing (because the innovation would be developed anyway) and 
saves society from needlessly suffering the well-known negative consequences 
of patents, including the restriction on output caused by a patentee’s exclusive 
rights and the administrative and litigation costs associated with running a 
patent system. 
Yet despite its apparent promise as the theoretical basis for the most 
important patentability doctrine, Graham’s inducement standard has achieved 
only a modicum of influence.9 Though frequently cited, the inducement 
standard is often relegated to a passing mention or a footnote in introducing 
the patentability standard.10 Some articles have devoted more extended 
attention to the inducement standard, but these too have generally highlighted 
 
Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 887 (2004) (stating that “the 
implementation of [the nonobviousness] standard poses certain administrative 
challenges”); Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem: How the Indeterminate 
Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 57, 59 (2008) 
(explaining that the indeterminacy of the nonobviousness standard results in too many 
patent grants even though “[t]he nonobvious standard is not simply too low, but both too 
high and too low. It is indeterminate.”); Joshua McGuire, Nonobviousness: Limitations on 
Evidentiary Support, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 175 (2003) (“To obtain a patent, one must 
have patentable subject matter that is useful, novel, nonobvious, and adequately described; 
however, the standard for a nonobvious invention is often difficult to apply.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
9.  Some commentators, meanwhile, have criticized Graham for failing to articulate a clear test. 
T.J. Chiang, for example, notes: “The opinion gave all the appearance of expecting a 
solution to appear out of thin air once the formula was followed. The lack of an articulable 
rule meant that determinations of obviousness took the appearance—and arguably the 
reality—of resting on judicial whim . . . .” Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent 
Obviousness, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 39, 49 (2008) (footnote omitted). 
10.  For example, Rebecca Eisenberg begins the analysis in a recent article by noting: “In theory, 
[the nonobviousness] standard prevents the issuance of patents on inventions that, 
although new, are so close to the prior art that they are likely to be forthcoming even 
without the incentive of a patent.” Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem, 12 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 375, 381 (2008). The footnote to that sentence quotes Graham’s 
articulation of the inducement standard, id. at 381 n.13, but inducement theory is never again 
mentioned in the remainder of the article. Similarly, Gregory Mandel quotes Graham’s 
inducement standard in a footnote. See Mandel, supra note 8, at 85 n.121. Yet Mandel 
describes the sentence from Graham as “dicta” and concludes that the Graham Court did not 
hold “that this is what the statutory nonobviousness standard actually measures.” Id. 
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the difficulties in using the standard to decide cases or to shape legal doctrine.11 
For example, Ed Kitch’s classic verdict on Graham’s inducement standard 
emphasized that the nonobviousness requirement, as articulated by the courts, 
provides only an “awkward” tool “to sort out those innovations that would not 
be developed absent a patent system,” with the “focus” of the legal doctrine 
always being on other issues.12 Kitch’s view has become the consensus. Thus, 
in a widely cited and influential 2003 report, the Federal Trade Commission 
summarized the testimony of numerous legal and economics scholars as 
demonstrating that, even though the inducement standard represents “the 
right way to assess whether to grant a patent” from a “theoretical perspective,” 
the standard is not “administrable,” so “the more manageable standards of the 
patent statute have evolved to serve as the means by which to measure when to 
grant a patent.”13 
In some ways, we agree with these prior assessments of the inducement 
standard. There is a certain awkwardness in the relationship between the 
inducement standard and the nonobviousness requirement, at least as that 
requirement has previously been articulated by the courts. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court in Graham did not provide a rigorous foundation for deriving 
the inducement standard from the statutory language. The absence of such a 
legal foundation may explain why courts and the Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO) have typically avoided looking to the inducement standard for guidance 
in interpreting and applying the statutory nonobviousness requirement. The 
one exception, an insightful but ultimately flawed panel opinion by Judge 
Posner, relied on the inducement standard to invalidate a patent but 
nevertheless failed to identify any administrable test or metrics for applying the 
inducement standard to the specific facts of that case or other cases.14 Posner’s 
 
11.  Glynn Lunney considers the inducement standard in his treatment of obviousness doctrine, 
but in his view the lack of “empirical evidence [for] determining the point at which a patent 
becomes necessary to induce desirable invention” is a stumbling block to using the 
inducement standard more extensively in crafting patentability doctrine. Glynn S. Lunney, 
Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 416 (2001). Similarly, Samuel 
Oddi has provided a treatment of inducement theory. A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic 
Theories of Patents: The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 277-81 (1996). 
But he views the theory as merely one of several competing theories of the patent system, see 
id. at 268-71, and he does not attempt to refine the obviousness doctrine to conform to an 
inducement standard. 
12.  Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 SUP. CT. 
REV. 293, 301. 
13.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION 
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 1, at 11 (2003). 
14.  See infra notes 112-135 and accompanying text. 
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panel opinion was vacated en banc,15 and that history has perhaps cemented the 
notions that the inducement standard conflicts with the statutory obviousness 
standard, is antipatent, or is simply too difficult to apply in actual cases. 
This Article aspires to show those notions to be wrong and to revitalize the 
inducement standard as the touchstone for understanding and refining the 
obviousness doctrine. The result should be more coherent, defensible, and 
predictable decisionmaking than is possible either under the current doctrine 
or under Judge Posner’s treatment, which missed important implications of the 
inducement standard. 
There are two motivations for undertaking this project. First, the time is 
right. In its 2007 decision KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,16 the Supreme 
Court overturned a quarter-century-old test for nonobviousness that the 
nation’s expert appellate court for patent law, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, had meticulously constructed. The KSR decision has 
precipitated a vibrant debate among scholars seeking to help the courts rebuild 
a pragmatic obviousness doctrine that yields predictable answers and is more 
theoretically sound than the Federal Circuit doctrine rejected in KSR.17 That 
reconstruction project can have little hope of enduring success without 
 
15.  See Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 697 F.2d 796 (7th Cir.), vacated en banc, 723 F.2d 1324, 
1329 (7th Cir. 1983). 
16.  550 U.S. 398 (2007). The Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s test as excessively rigid and 
formalistic. Id. at 419. The Supreme Court explained that “familiar items may have obvious 
uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be 
able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle,” precluding 
bright-line tests. Id. at 420. 
17.  See, e.g., Durie & Lemley, supra note 6, at 998 (arguing for a more realistic inquiry into 
obviousness, and noting that “[i]n KSR, the Supreme Court ostensibly made the 
obviousness inquiry more ‘flexible’ and pragmatic”); Eisenberg, supra note 10 (analyzing the 
effect of KSR on the application of the nonobvious standard to pharmaceutical patents); 
Jeanne C. Fromer, The Layers of Obviousness in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 76 
(2008) (discussing the proper object of the nonobviousness inquiry and stating that 
“[d]espite this overarching purpose [of encouraging innovation] highlighted in KSR, 
neither courts nor scholars have analyzed or settled on the obviousness inquiry’s object, that 
is, the thing which must be nonobvious”); Meurer & Strandburg, supra note 4, at 548, 551 
(measuring the effect of the nonobvious standard on the “choice of research projects” and 
stating that “[t]he KSR decision clears the way for new thinking about the obviousness 
issue, which, despite its importance, is surprisingly under-theorized”); Joseph Scott Miller, 
Remixing Obviousness, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 237, 240 (2008) (discussing the impact of 
KSR on the concept of the person having ordinary skill in the art and advancing a 
“framework for determining whether a combination claim is nonobvious”); Joshua D. 
Sarnoff, Bilcare, KSR, Presumptions of Validity, Preliminary Relief, and Obviousness in Patent 
Law, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 995, 1036 (2008) (“Whatever the legal or factual status 
of the obviousness inquiry, KSR has enormous importance as it has clearly raised the bar for 
determining when inventions are non-obvious and thus patentable.”). 
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reexamining and reevaluating the ultimate goal of the nonobviousness 
requirement. 
A second and more important motivation is the promise of the inducement 
standard in providing significant insights into some of the most difficult 
theoretical and practical problems in the field. Economic analysis of patent law 
frequently begins with the assertion that patents present a social tradeoff 
between providing incentives for innovation at the expense of accepting the 
deadweight loss associated with monopoly-like exclusive rights.18 And even 
beyond the law-and-economics literature, legal scholars often frame intellectual 
property law generally and patent law in particular as presenting a conflict 
between the public and private domains—a choice between openness and 
exclusivity.19 If, however, the law follows Graham’s inducement standard, such 
tradeoffs and conflicts do not necessarily exist. 
Under a rigorously enforced inducement standard, patents would cover 
only those innovations that otherwise would not be created or disclosed—in 
 
18.  See, e.g., WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL 
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 76 (1969) (creating a model for calculating 
optimal patent term by balancing increased incentives for innovation against greater 
deadweight loss); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 
RAND J. ECON. 106, 106 (1990) (referring to “the conventional analysis of optimal patent 
length, based on the tradeoff between the incentives for innovation and the extent of static 
monopoly deadweight loss”). 
19.  See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public 
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter-Spring 2003, at 33, 38 (describing the “limits 
to intellectual property rights” as the “antierosion walls around the public domain” and 
more generally arguing that expansions of intellectual property rights erode the public 
domain); Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in 
Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 375 (2005) (noting the effect of the 
expansion of intellectual property rights on the contraction of the public domain); Christine 
D. Galbraith, A Panoptic Approach to Information Policy: Utilizing a More Balanced Theory of 
Property in Order To Ensure the Existence of a Prodigious Public Domain, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
1, 4 (2007) (advocating for a more accessible public domain because “[u]nfortunately, the 
public domain appears to be diminishing as the recent trend in formulating information 
policy is to utilize an organizing concept of private property ownership”); Pamela 
Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783, 791 (2006) 
(acknowledging the tension between intellectual property rights and protecting the public 
domain and quoting International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human 
productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—become, after 
voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use.”)); John R. Therien, 
Exorcising the Specter of a “Pay-Per-Use” Society: Toward Preserving Fair Use and the Public 
Domain in the Digital Age, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979, 1035 (2001) (arguing that “the 
judiciary must protect the public domain and fair use, whether impinged upon by 
technology-derived statutory rights or the technology itself”). 
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other words, patents would cover only innovations that, without the patent 
system, would not have been in the public domain. The patent system would 
then have only positive effects on the public domain: patents would cover only 
inventions that would otherwise not be in the public domain and, when the 
patents expire, the inventions would enter into and enrich the public domain. 
Similarly, the apparent deadweight losses created by patent rights would be an 
illusion because, if patent rights had not been available, the invention would 
not have been available from competing firms but instead would have been 
either unavailable or covered by trade secrecy. As we will show in this Article, 
the optimal implementation of the inducement standard may not achieve such 
a Panglossian resolution because, at least in some circumstances, patents 
should be allowed even if they merely induce earlier innovation. Thus, the 
analysis suggested by the inducement standard helps to identify more clearly 
the precise economic tradeoff at issue: patents produce earlier innovation but at 
the cost of higher prices and associated deadweight loss in a later period (when 
the invention would have existed even without the inducement of the patent). 
This point highlights another deep theoretical strength of the inducement 
standard, for it holds out the hope of grounding patentability decisions in a 
more rigorous economic framework and thereby bringing patent law closer to 
the vast body of modern regulatory law that commonly uses economic analysis 
in making specific decisions about the scope and extent of regulation. 
The Article’s rehabilitation of the inducement standard begins, in Part I, 
with an investigation of doctrinal difficulties associated with Graham’s 
inducement standard. As Professor Kitch noted over forty years ago, the 
nonobviousness requirement seems at first to be an awkward way to 
implement an inducement standard. We agree that perhaps one natural 
interpretation of the statutory text points toward a cognitive definition of 
nonobviousness that focuses on whether individuals have epistemic awareness 
of technological solutions to problems. In embracing the inducement standard 
as the ultimate theory underlying nonobviousness, the Graham Court 
embraced an economic definition of nonobviousness and implicitly rejected a 
cognitive approach in interpreting the statute. The Court, however, failed to 
provide a sufficient legal justification for that interpretation, and that failure 
has almost certainly made courts and lawyers wary of placing too much 
reliance on the theoretical standard. Yet establishing a legal justification for the 
inducement standard is not so difficult. The statute itself sets the obviousness 
standard by reference to a highly fictional concept, the “person having ordinary 
skill in the art.”20 Defining that fictional person’s abilities by reference to 
 
20.  35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
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economic incentives rather than technological cognition is no more radical than 
the now-familiar use of economics to define the behavior of the fictional 
reasonable person in tort law.21 
The awkwardness of the inducement standard is, however, only partially 
remedied by the development of a more rigorous legal basis justifying the use 
of the standard in patentability determinations. Part II of the Article introduces 
ambiguities, puzzles, and other difficulties associated with the inducement 
standard. Because the inducement standard has not been taken seriously in the 
past, these ambiguities and difficulties have not been resolved. Our analysis 
leads to three necessary clarifications of Graham’s inducement standard. 
First, Graham’s articulation of the inducement standard may be fairly 
criticized for treating a fundamentally dynamic issue—invention—as if it were 
static, with no time frame specified or implicit. Graham’s inducement standard 
asks which inventions would be devised and disclosed even without the 
inducement of a patent, but it is silent on the crucial question: devised and 
disclosed by when? Even with no patent system, it is hard to imagine that 
many inventions would remain undevised and undisclosed forever. Thus, if the 
Graham inducement standard were interpreted as trying to identify “those 
inventions which would not [ever] be disclosed or devised but for the 
inducement of a patent,”22 then almost nothing would be patentable. On the 
other hand, if the inducement standard were interpreted as trying to identify 
“those inventions which would not [immediately] be disclosed or devised but 
for the inducement of a patent,”23 almost everything would be patentable 
because patent law presumably provides at least marginal incentives for 
inventing earlier. Both extremes must be wrong. We show that Graham’s 
inducement standard is best interpreted as requiring patents to cover only 
those inventions that, but for the inducement of a patent, would not have be 
disclosed or devised for a substantial period of time. Our reformulation 
produces a dynamic inducement standard, which is consistent with the 
growing body of literature that views the patent system as attempting not so 
much to increase but to accelerate invention. 
A second insight relies upon an important feature of the patent system: 
competition. The modern patent system does not grant monopolies to industry 
participants that the sovereign happens to favor. Rather, patents are awarded 
competitively, and the competition to obtain patents has important 
implications for the practical enforcement of the patentability standard. Our 
 
21.  See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
22.  Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966). 
23.  Id. 
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dynamic adjustment to the inducement standard introduces the concept of a 
“substantial period of time,” which naturally leads to the question of just how 
substantial a time period is necessary. Yet the competitive structure of the 
patent system makes the answer to that question less important than it first 
seems. The strong incentives of the patent system, coupled with the 
competition to obtain patents, should substantially accelerate the time of 
innovation, often by a period longer than the patent term itself, except in 
certain specific circumstances—the circumstances that make a patent-
motivated innovator insignificantly better (that is, insignificantly earlier) than 
an innovator not motivated by the patent system. Those circumstances can 
serve as proxies for the inducement standard so that, by looking for such 
circumstances, government officials and judges can identify inventions not 
induced by the patent system without invoking any complex models of 
technological acceleration. These circumstances include a rapid decline in the 
cost of innovation, for example, because of the development of a technology 
that is an input into the new technology, or a positive demand shock shortly 
before invention, especially where multiple firms respond to the shock by 
developing the technology and even more so if some of those firms do not 
appear to be patent-motivated. 
A third and final clarification to Graham’s inducement standard resolves the 
ambiguity in the concept of “invention.” Once it is recognized that the 
inducement standard must be interpreted dynamically—so that the inquiry is 
whether the inducement of the patent accelerated the arrival of the invention—
then a crucial question becomes: what precisely must be accelerated, the 
conception of an invention or its practical, commercial implementation? Our 
conclusion is that Graham’s standard should be interpreted as requiring the 
inducement of an earlier arrival of the commercialized invention, not merely 
the “invention” in theory or on paper in a patent disclosure. A contrary 
approach would induce what we call “speculative patents”—patents that 
describe possible future applications of embryonic technologies. Such 
speculative patents, if they were to be allowed, might have a high option 
value—they would be valuable if technological development takes a particular 
course. But if the patents do little or nothing to advance the actual arrival of 
new technology in practical terms, then they would have little or no social 
value. 
This third clarification to the inducement standard provides insight into 
what has so far been a muddled debate about the meaning and desirability of 
so-called patent trolls. The term “patent troll” has been generally, if somewhat 
loosely, defined in the literature as a “nonpracticing entity,” an entity that has 
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never commercialized or “practiced” its patented technology.24 Such 
nonpracticing entities have generated enormous controversy in recent years 
and, as the label “troll” suggests, some patent practitioners have a visceral sense 
that, at least in some circumstances, such nonpracticing entities stand in the 
way of true innovators. But under orthodox patent doctrine and theory, it 
should not matter whether an entity practices a patent, because the quid pro 
quo of the patent is said to encompass merely the disclosure in the patent 
document. Our approach to the Graham inducement standard shows why it 
can matter whether an entity is practicing its invention: while a nonpracticing 
patentee might accelerate the actual practice of an invention, it is difficult to 
believe that has happened if other parties have independently invented and 
commercialized the technology without even planning to seek patent 
protection. Such circumstances would seem to be powerful evidence that the 
inducement of the patent was unnecessary to generate the invention and thus 
that the patent may be invalid under the inducement standard. 
While Parts I and II are devoted to resolving the previously perceived legal 
and theoretical awkwardness of the inducement standard, Part III focuses on 
the other major criticism of the standard—that it is unadministrable. Many 
doctrines of patent law can be subjected to the simplistic objection that they 
lack mathematical precision, and prior approaches to the nonobviousness 
standard have been especially vulnerable to such attacks. A reinterpreted 
inducement standard need not demonstrate perfection. It can be an 
administrative success if it is even just a bit better than current doctrine as a 
helpful theoretical and pragmatic guide for applying the obviousness doctrine. 
We believe that the inducement standard easily satisfies that test. As a 
theoretical matter, the inducement standard provides a sound basis for 
interpreting “the person having ordinary skill in the art” not only as a person 
possessing technological knowledge but also as someone who is responsive to 
both economic incentives and economic limitations. Those economic incentives 
and limitations not only help to answer the previously intractable question of 
how obvious something must be to be obvious under the statute; they also help 
to unify patent law with bodies of regulatory law as diverse as common law 
torts, antitrust law, and modern federal administrative law. Beyond its 
 
24.  Peter Detkin, former assistant general counsel of Intel, claims to have created this term in 
2001 while describing companies that do not create patents but rather buy them and then 
demand unusually high license fees by threatening costly litigation in the alternative. See 
Peter N. Detkin, Leveling the Patent Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 636, 
636 (2007). The broadest definition describes a patent troll as an entity that extracts profits 
by offering a target entity an option of purchasing a license or facing litigation. See Thomas 
S. Kim & Michael D. Stein, Patent Value: Increased Interest Extends Beyond ‘Trolls,’ LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER, May 23, 2005, at IP3. 
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theoretical successes, the inducement standard can also be a practical success. 
For example, it provides concrete guidance for how the nonobviousness 
standard should apply in fields like software, in which the costs of achieving 
any particular innovation may fall over time25 and mechanisms other than 
patents (such as copyright protection) are likely to provide very significant 
inducements for innovation. The inducement standard suggests that patent 
examiners and judges should be especially vigilant in enforcing the nonobvious 
requirement in such fields because, even without the inducement of patents, 
many innovations would have been produced at only slightly later times. 
Any disagreement about the specifics of our interpretation of the 
inducement standard should not obscure the overarching project. Graham’s 
inducement standard provides an intuitively simple and powerful framework 
to justify granting patents for some innovations and denying patents for 
others. If Graham’s articulation of the inducement standard is not perfect, it is 
nonetheless sufficiently meritorious and prominent to be worth saving. Our 
reinterpretation of the inducement standard merely ties it to three fundamental 
features of the patent system: it is dynamic, pragmatic, and competitive. The 
first two of those features are evident in the constitutional goal of the patent 
system: to “promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.”26 “Progress” reminds us 
that invention is dynamic and that producing invention earlier in time is a 
central objective of the system. The constitutional reference to the “useful Arts” 
makes clear that the specific form of progress we should care about lies in the 
practical realm. Finally, although patents reduce short-term competition to 
lower prices, they foster long-term competition among innovators to find and 
develop tomorrow’s technology. 
 
25.  One input for generating software innovation is almost certainly computing power, as 
experiments in software likely need to be repeatedly tested on fast computers. The cost of 
computing power has been dramatically falling ever since the “Moore’s Law” prediction 
decades ago, when Moore noted that the number of transistors that can be placed on an 
integrated circuit had doubled every year from 1959 to 1965 and predicted that the trend 
would continue for at least ten years. Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto 
Integrated Circuits, ELECTRONICS, Apr. 19, 1965, at 114, 115-16. His prediction has proved so 
far to be accurate, so much so that the law is now used in the semiconductor industry to 
guide long-term planning and set targets for research and development. See Harro van Lent 
& Arie Rip, Expectations in Technological Developments: An Example of Prospective Structures To 
Be Filled in by Agency, in GETTING NEW TECHNOLOGIES TOGETHER 203, 206-07 (Cornelis 
Disco & Barend van der Meulen eds., 1998).  
26.  U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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i .  rehabilitating the inducement standard: a doctrinal 
foundation 
It may seem exceptionally odd to begin with a doctrinal justification of a 
standard already supported by Supreme Court precedent. Yet any candid 
assessment must acknowledge that, despite its endorsement by the Supreme 
Court in 1966, the inducement standard has not shaped subsequent doctrinal 
development of the patentability standard. A reason for this startling absence 
of influence is that in neither Graham nor in subsequent cases has the Supreme 
Court attempted either to reconcile the inducement standard with the statutory 
text or to provide a general theoretical or doctrinal foundation for the 
inducement standard. Thus, the inducement standard has been viewed as a 
theoretical tangent in the Graham opinion, or perhaps even as an unhelpful 
distraction from the statutory inquiry. 
The statutory text must be the starting point for any attempt to supply the 
inducement standard with a doctrinal foundation. As will be discussed in 
Section I.A, that text might seem at first glance to point toward a cognitive test 
of obviousness. Yet a cognitive approach to the statutory nonobviousness 
requirement raises numerous questions while offering little or no guidance for 
answering those questions. Section I.B then compares the inducement 
standard and the statutory text in more detail and finds that the most 
important features of the inducement standard are easily harmonized with the 
statutory text and structure. Section I.C examines the inducement standard in 
light of general regulatory theory and practice. Doctrine outside patent law 
justifies using an economic approach to interpret legal provisions, and the 
inducement standard can serve as the guide for an economic approach to 
obviousness. Finally, Section I.D analyzes three additional nuances of the 
inducement standard. 
A. The Difficulties with a Cognitive Approach 
Section 103(a) of the Patent Act provides the statutory foundation for the 
obviousness doctrine: 
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject 
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention 
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said 
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subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the 
manner in which the invention was made.27 
The word “obvious” is consistent with a cognitive approach, as a standard 
definition of the word is “[e]asily discovered, seen, or understood,”28 and the 
last of these in particular focuses on the mental process of understanding or 
cognition.29 Perhaps because the word “obvious” names the statutory doctrine, 
courts and commentators have tended to assume, implicitly or explicitly,30 that 
the doctrine focuses on the degree of cognitive difficulty in conceiving the 
invention. 
A purely cognitive approach to applying the statutory standard runs into 
immediate difficulty when the standard is read in its entirety, for obviousness 
is tested by reference to what would have been obvious not to any actual 
person, but to “a person having ordinary skill in the art”31—abbreviated 
typically, if inelegantly, as “PHOSITA.” As discussed below, the courts have 
constructed this person with attributes acknowledged to be highly fictional, 
and those fictional attributes make it difficult or impossible to gain any real 
intuition as to the cognitive processes of the mythical PHOSITA. That 
stumbling block is only the beginning of the problems for a cognitive 
approach. 
 
27.  35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
28.  WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1683 (2d ed. 1957). The word derives from the 
Latin prefix ob- (meaning “in the way of” or “on”) and the Latin word via (“street”). The 
word “ob-via” could be accurately translated as “lying in the street.” 
29.  The words “easily discovered,” meanwhile, are consistent with an economic approach. See 
infra text following note 76. 
30.  See, e.g., In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (focusing on “the understandings 
and knowledge of persons having ordinary skill in the art”); Colleen M. Seifert, Now Why 
Didn’t I Think of That? The Cognitive Processes That Create the Obvious, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 489 (2008) (offering a psychological critique of the courts’ approaches to 
nonobviousness but on the assumption that nonobviousness is an epistemic phenomenon); 
Dorothy Whelan, Note, A Critique of the Use of Secondary Considerations in Applying the 
Section 103 Nonobviousness Test for Patentability, 28 B.C. L. REV. 357, 381 (1987) (suggesting 
that the purpose of secondary considerations “is to ascertain the state of mind of a 
hypothetical worker having ordinary skill”). 
31.  35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
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1. The Imaginary Person of Extraordinary Knowledge and Ordinary 
Creativity 
The courts have rejected the proposition that the construct of a “person 
having ordinary skill in the art” should be defined by reference to the actual or 
average abilities of real individuals. In Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & 
Johnson32—a decision that the Federal Circuit handed down only two years after 
its creation—Judge Rich emphasized that this person was a “hypothetical 
person” and “an imaginary being” and forthrightly acknowledged that “the 
courts have always applied a standard based on an imaginary worker of their 
own devising.”33 The Federal Circuit has since held that whatever an actual 
expert “did or did not personally realize at the time based on his actual 
knowledge is irrelevant” to applying the statutory nonobviousness standard 
because the “relevant inquiry” is always directed toward “what a hypothetical 
ordinarily skilled artisan would have gleaned from [the prior art].”34 
Furthermore, the court has repeatedly recognized that this “legal construct”of 
the “hypothetical person”35—this “ghost”36—“is akin to the ‘reasonable person’ 
used as a reference in negligence determinations.”37 
The reference to the “reasonable person” of tort law is an important signal. 
At least one school of thought during the last century—one might even say the 
dominant school—has viewed the “reasonable” person as different from the 
“average” person.38 The reasonable person in tort is instead an “ideal creature” 
whose behavior is controlled “not [by] what is, but [by] what ought to be.”39 
Lon Fuller and William Perdue long ago recognized that reasonable person 
tests have “an element of circularity” and are “subject to manipulation by the 
 
32.  745 F.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
33.  Id. at 1454. 
34.  Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
35.  In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
36.  Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
37.  Rouffet, 149 F.3d at 1357; see also Panduit, 810 F.2d at 1566 (noting that, in applying the 
obviousness test, “the decisionmaker confronts a ghost, i.e., ‘a person having ordinary skill 
in the art,’ not unlike the ‘reasonable man’ and other ghosts in the law”). 
38.  Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 114 (1924) (“[T]he 
‘reasonable man’ is not the average man.”). 
39.  Id. at 113-14; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 173-75 (5th ed. 
1984) (emphasizing that the reasonable person is described by the courts as a “community 
ideal of reasonable behavior” and not as any actual person who might very well do 
unreasonable things from time to time). 
  
the yale law journal  120: 159 0  2 011  
1606 
 
simple device of defining the characteristics of the hypothetical man.”40 This 
circularity can be eliminated only with an appropriate normative foundation, 
such as economics.41 
Without such a framework, the concept of a “person having ordinary skill” 
is similarly question-begging. The cognitive approach does not provide a 
normative foundation, let alone a clear doctrinal test, for determining what 
constitutes the level of “ordinary skill.” It would be circular to define “ordinary 
skill” by reference to inventors, because the statute defines invention by 
reference to ordinary skill.42 The Federal Circuit has held that “[i]nventors, as a 
class, according to the concepts underlying the Constitution and the statutes 
that have created the patent system, possess something—call it what you will—
which sets them apart from the workers of ordinary skill.”43 This follows as a 
matter of definition, but if we cannot get a handle on or even a name for this 
“something,” the law will inevitably reflect a series of ad hoc and ungrounded 
policy judgments. 
In the absence of a compelling normative framework, the courts have 
defined the person of ordinary skill to be a rather extraordinary creature, an idiot 
savant with extraordinary knowledge and virtually no creativity. The mind of 
this hypothetical person comes equipped with a complete and thorough 
knowledge of all legally pertinent prior art, far more knowledge than could be 
possessed by any average or actual researcher.44 Thus, the hypothetical person, 
as constructed by the courts, is deemed to know about pieces of prior art that 
are not only extremely difficult to find—for example, a single copy of a doctoral 
 
40.  L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 
YALE L.J. 52, 85 (1936). For recognition of similar circularity problems in other areas, see 
Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 511 n.34 
(2007), which identifies circularity in the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonable” expectation of 
privacy; and James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: 
Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 273 (2004), noting circularity in the test 
of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980), which makes a 
court’s jurisdiction turn on whether defendants could “reasonably anticipate being haled 
into court there.” 
41.  That foundation in turn allows for critique of the test announced. See, e.g., Allan M. 
Feldman & Jeonghyun Kim, The Hand Rule and United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 
Reconsidered, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 523 (2005) (identifying inefficiencies in Hand’s 
formulation). 
42.  35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006) (referring to “a person having ordinary skill in the art”). 
43.  Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
44.  See, e.g., MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 3, at 762-63 (recognizing that, in degree of 
knowledge, the person having ordinary skill is a “superperson” in the art). 
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dissertation in a library of a foreign country,45 an entry in a commercial 
catalogue circulated overseas,46 or a few uses of an unpublished process 
somewhere inside the United States47—but even impossible to find—for 
example, patent specifications still being held in secret by the Patent Office,48 
and inventions still held in secret by other inventors.49 Meanwhile, the Federal 
Circuit at one time described the person of ordinary skill as someone “who 
thinks along the line of conventional wisdom in the art and is not one who 
undertakes to innovate.”50 
Constructing the person of ordinary skill in this way may have seemed the 
most straightforward path to making the cognitive test administrable. A court 
could perhaps imagine the logical processes of a well-read robot and hold 
innovations obvious only where the prior art “connect[ed] the dots . . . very, 
very clearly.”51 That case law, however, did not survive the Supreme Court’s 
decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., which stated that “[a] person 
of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”52 
Whatever administrability benefit the courts once derived from their textually 
implausible construction of “ordinary” is thus lost today. The cognitive 
approach provides no guide for determining what constitutes “ordinary 
creativity.” Even if creativity could be measured by something like IQ, the 
cognitive approach provides no basis for determining, even at a conceptual 
level, what an appropriate cutoff would be. 
It might seem that the cognitive approach might be salvageable if the 
courts used real people as a reference point.53 But this would introduce new 
 
45.  See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
46.  See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
47.  See id. 
48.  See Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252, 255-56 (1965) (holding that § 102(e) 
patent applications are a source of prior art for purposes of § 103). 
49.  See In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1283 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (counting as within the prior art an earlier 
invention as long as that invention was not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed, even if the 
invention was not available to the public at the relevant time). 
50.  Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
51.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 13, ch. 4, at 11 (recounting the 2002 testimony of Stephen 
Kunin, Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office, and describing his understanding of the Federal Circuit’s case law on obviousness). 
52.  550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007). 
53.  Courts sometimes use real people to help define the level of ordinary skill but often in 
passing. See infra note 237 and accompanying text. Perhaps this is because of the courts’ 
insistence that the construct is hypothetical or perhaps because the cognitive approach offers 
no good way of answering the question. 
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potential for arbitrariness. Skill exists on a continuum, ranging from the 
student just learning a subject to the world’s foremost expert. Ordinary skill is 
somewhere in the middle. We cannot define ordinary skill as the level of those 
who are awarded patents because this too would be circular. Perhaps we might 
then define the level as that needed to earn a livelihood in a field without 
earning patents. This is close to the solution that we will reach under the 
inducement standard,54 but the cognitive approach does not provide an 
explanation for why this is the level that should matter. Moreover, the level of 
ordinary skill would then be higher for fields in which a group of people needs 
knowledge of the field to perform their work, even if those individuals are 
performing a type of work that does not involve innovation. But why should 
this happenstance of job specialization matter? The people who ought to 
matter, we will argue, are those who would be inventing without patents. This 
observation flows not from a cognitive approach but from the inducement 
standard. 
2. The Degree of Obviousness and the Commingling of Economic Factors 
In addition to the theoretical difficulties in defining the person having 
ordinary skill, courts applying the statutory obviousness standard must also 
confront the ultimate question of how obvious something must be in order for 
it to be viewed as “obvious,” and therefore unpatentable, as a matter of law. 
Even if the courts were to follow a cognitive approach to obviousness, they 
would still confront this “how obvious” question, and the cognitive approach 
provides no guidance except for the insight that, cognitively, problems can 
present a full spectrum of difficulty—from the extremely obvious to the 
extremely hard.55 The cognitive approach is especially ill equipped to resolve 
the “how obvious” question, in part because cognition is an epistemic 
phenomenon that takes place at a particular moment in time while invention 
occurs across time. Once the hypothetical person of ordinary skill becomes the 
focus of the obviousness inquiry, the natural question would be how much 
effort it would take this person to arrive at the solution; a cognitive approach, 
rigorously followed, instead seems to ask about the chance that the person of 
ordinary skill would see the solution at the outset. 
 
54.  See infra Subsection I.B.2. 
55.  The case law rarely recognizes even this, instead dichotomizing “‘ordinary innovation’ or 
‘ordinary creativity’ on one hand and ‘real innovation’ on the other,” despite psychological 
evidence that “creativity is believed to vary along a continuum.” Mandel, supra note 8, at 
120-21. 
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It should not be surprising then that the doctrine of nonobviousness in fact 
does not adhere to a rigorous cognitive definition of nonobviousness. The 
category of what is “obvious” as a matter of patent law clearly extends to more 
than just situations where the person of ordinary skill could consider the 
problem in an instant and immediately intuit the solution. In KSR, the 
Supreme Court made clear that the obviousness standard can be met in some 
situations where several potential solutions to a problem are “obvious to try.”56 
The Court wrote: 
When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and 
there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of 
ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his 
or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely 
the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.57 
Thus, a solution can be deemed legally obvious even though the person having 
ordinary skill would have had to “pursue” “a finite number” of potential 
solutions until an “anticipated success” is realized. 
The “obvious to try” doctrine presents judges following a purely cognitive 
approach with a set of unappealing choices. Consider, for example, two 
potential research projects, both of which are obvious to try. Each research 
project requires researchers to explore a fairly large number of potential 
alternatives to find a solution. The testing of each alternative is routine, 
demanding nothing more than time and competent labor. In each case, the 
researcher can be fairly confident that a solution will be found, but prior to 
undertaking experiments the exact solution cannot be predicted. Finally, 
assume that, for one research project, the testing of all possible solutions can be 
concluded at low cost within a few hours while, for the other, testing will take 
years and hundreds of millions of dollars. 
The inducement standard provides a clear intuition about whether the 
fruits of each research project should be patentable: the patent probably should 
be granted for the years-long project, but not for the hours-long project. Yet if 
judges follow a purely cognitive approach, without peeking at the utterly 
different economics of the two scenarios, they will find the two scenarios 
difficult or impossible to distinguish. The judges might feel compelled to find 
neither patentable, following literally the Supreme Court’s reference to “a finite 
number of identified, predictable solutions.” Or judges attracted to the 
cognitive approach might be tempted to hold the results of both research 
 
56.  550 U.S. at 421. 
57.  Id. 
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projects to be patentable, for in both the end solution cannot be recognized at 
the outset. 
This problem is not hypothetical. In In re Deuel,58 the Federal Circuit 
considered whether it was obvious to isolate the DNA sequence coding for a 
particular human protein given that (1) the protein had previously been 
discovered, and (2) there were available techniques by which a researcher could 
isolate the DNA sequence coding for any protein once the protein was known. 
The PTO adopted an appropriate methodological approach, looking to the 
practicalities—that is, the economics—of the problem. The agency concluded 
that the DNA sequence was obvious because the agency found that, once a 
protein’s amino acid sequence is known (indeed, even if it is only partially 
known), well-known screening techniques could find the corresponding DNA 
sequence for the protein by “effectively sampl[ing] all the DNA of the 
mammalian cell” in a process that would take “at worst, only a few weeks.”59 
While holding the isolated DNA sequence obvious made good policy sense, 
the Federal Circuit nonetheless reversed the agency. The court’s decision serves 
as a paradigm of the pure cognitive approach. The court reasoned that 
knowledge of the amino acid sequence of a protein does not necessarily render 
obvious the corresponding DNA sequence because there were “an enormous 
number of DNA sequences” that could potentially code for the protein.60 In its 
prior decision In re Bell,61 which was repeatedly cited in Deuel,62 the Federal 
Circuit had determined that “more than 1036 different nucleotide sequences” 
could encode the particular protein at issue there.63 Numbers like 1036—one 
undecillion, or a trillion trillion trillion—are certainly enormous. No one could 
guess it until the screening procedures were complete. To the PTO, the 
cognitive difficulty posed by that multitude of possibilities did not matter as 
long as known screening procedures could be used to isolate the correct DNA 
 
58.  51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
59.  Ex parte Deuel, No. 92-3627, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445, 1447 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 30, 1993) 
(quoting JAMES D. WATSON ET AL., RECOMBINANT DNA: A SHORT COURSE 78 (1983), which 
was then a standard reference in the field). We would not automatically assume that any 
process that would be expected to take only a few weeks could not be patented. The 
question is whether inventors could be expected to take the time in the absence of patent 
protection, and this might depend in turn on the potential benefits from completing the 
invention. See infra Subsection III.B.1. 
60.  In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1558. 
61.  991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
62.  See, e.g., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1559, 1560. 
63.  In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 784. 
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sequence without any difficulty or any undue experimentation.64 To the 
Federal Circuit, however, “the existence of a general method of isolating . . . 
DNA molecules is essentially irrelevant to the question whether the specific 
molecules themselves would have been obvious.”65 This logic suggests that the 
court would have reached the same outcome even if the screening could be 
completed in a matter of minutes on inexpensive equipment. 
Deuel makes perfect sense from a cognitive perspective, but it was terrible 
policy and a poor interpretation of the statutory patentability standard. The 
decision was widely criticized by academics and, toward the end of its life, 
began to draw criticism even within the Federal Circuit, with Judge Rader 
offering very pointed criticism of the decision.66 Soon after the Supreme Court 
decided KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,67 the PTO took the opportunity 
to assert that the analysis in Deuel had to be disavowed in light of the new 
Supreme Court teachings.68 In In re Kubin,69 Judge Rader was able to garner 
the votes to sustain the agency’s pragmatic approach. The Federal Circuit 
overruled Deuel and specifically embraced the argument that, in determining 
the obviousness of DNA sequences coding for a particular protein, the courts 
must take into account “the ease and predictability” of techniques for isolating 
those DNA sequences.70 
“Ease” is, of course, a relative term, and that is its strength. The term 
invites judgment about the economic factors that make the process of 
developing something new more or less difficult. Finding the right DNA 
sequence out of a trillion trillion trillion possibilities should be considered easy 
if standard, low-cost techniques can resolve the problem in a short time and 
there would be ample incentive to undertake the effort even without patents. 
Finding the right answer among a mere ten or twenty possibilities may be 
considered difficult if testing each possibility requires enormous expense, time, 
and effort. As in Deuel, the purely cognitive approach to obviousness has no 
 
64.  In In re Bell, the PTO had reasoned that standard techniques could be “easily” applied to 
isolate the DNA coding for a particular known protein. Id. at 785 (quoting the reasoning of 
the PTO Board). The Federal Circuit rejected that reasoning, see id., so in In re Deuel the 
agency tried to use synonyms for “easily,” 51 F.3d at 1556. 
65.  In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1559. 
66.  See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that In re Deuel should be overruled). 
67.  550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
68.  Ex parte Kubin, No. 2007-0819, 2007 Pat. App. LEXIS 13, at *11, *17 (B.P.A.I. May 31, 2007) 
(reasoning that KSR “cast doubt on the viability of Deuel”). 
69.  561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
70.  Id. at 1360; see also id. at 1358 (holding that KSR discredited the holding of Deuel). 
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place for considering those factors. Deuel’s demise shows that the courts have 
not been able to maintain a purely cognitive approach. Mixing economic 
considerations into the analysis—or better still, making economic factors the 
centerpiece of analysis rather than merely relevant factors—is desirable not 
only because it generates better patent policy but also because it represents the 
better interpretation of the statute and reconciles patent law with other areas of 
regulatory theory. To those matters we now turn. 
B. The Inducement Standard and the Statutory Text 
The intellectual weaknesses of the cognitive approach and the courts’ 
decisions that stray from this approach in service of the patent system’s policy 
goals do not themselves establish a legal justification for embracing an 
economic interpretation of the statutory nonobviousness requirement. The 
statutory text, it might be argued, still does not point toward an economic 
approach to defining patentability such as the inducement standard, and thus 
the courts should muddle along with a cognitive approach, despite its glaring 
flaws, with arbitrary exceptions where necessary. Yet careful analysis of the 
statute proves that the inducement standard provides a stronger framework for 
interpreting the statutory text than the cognitive approach. 
Our analysis focuses on a straightforward interpretation of three critical 
words in § 103: “A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between 
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the 
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention 
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject 
matter pertains.”71 We interpret “obvious” to mean its dictionary definition of 
“easily discovered,”72 “ordinary” to mean “not patent-induced,” and “person” 
to mean “human or entity.” We freely admit that there are alternative possible 
interpretations of each of these words standing alone, but each of these 
interpretations is readily defensible under ordinary principles of statutory 
interpretation, and reading these three words in this way makes them cohere 
with one another, with Graham, and, as we will show below,73 with regulatory 
law more generally. One could reject some aspect of this interpretation and still 
allow some role for the inducement standard, but the combination of all three 
of these points shows that the inducement standard in Graham is not an 
 
71.  35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
72.  See supra note 28. 
73.  See infra Section I.C. 
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extratextual gloss on or unjustified theory of the statute but a reasonable 
reading of it.74 
1. “Obvious” and Ease of Discovery 
The word “obvious” can mean not merely “easily understood” but also 
“easily discovered.”75 As the Deuel example shows, a standard based on the ease 
of discovery is not difficult to reconcile with an economic test, for such a 
standard recognizes both that something may be obvious even if it takes some 
searching and that the concept of obviousness is, like the concept of “easily,” a 
matter of degree and context. Even under a dictionary definition of “obvious,” 
courts need to evaluate how difficult a discovery must be before it can no 
longer be considered easy. There are three plausible approaches. First, the 
courts could try to articulate an absolute standard—a degree of anticipated 
time, difficulty, and expense beyond which a discovery will be considered not 
obvious. While that approach is linguistically plausible, it is also indeterminate. 
The statute provides no guidance for the courts to decide the level at which to 
fix this absolute standard. Perhaps the courts could do so—holding, for 
example, that an anticipated expense of one million dollars will be the 
threshold for nonobviousness—but this would be arbitrary.76 
 
74.  We also note that nothing in the legislative history of § 103 is inconsistent with interpreting 
the statute to impose an inducement standard of patentability. The legislative history 
confirms that the statute was intended to codify a requirement of patentability that had 
previously been imposed by “decisions of the courts,” and that Congress drew language 
from those decisions in writing the statute. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 7 (1952); S. 
REP. NO. 82-1979, at 6 (1952). Indeed, both the House and Senate Reports stated that the 
new statutory formulation was intended “to serve as a basis for the addition at a later time of 
some criteria which may be worked out.” H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 18; S. REP. NO. 82-1979, 
at 18. The legislative reports use the passive voice, leaving open whether the additional 
criteria would be “worked out” through the legislative process or through the judicial 
process in subsequent decisions. Given that the nonobviousness requirement was originally 
judge-made and Congress was approving that judicial development, it is a fair inference that 
Congress did not want to foreclose the judiciary from engaging in further common law 
development of the nonobviousness standard as future decisions “worked out” more specific 
criteria to measure and define the standard. 
75.  See supra text accompanying note 28. 
76.  Of course, the courts do sometimes announce holdings that include bright-line numeric 
thresholds. See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (establishing fourteen days 
as a bright line for determining whether a break in custody means that a criminal procedure 
protection no longer applies). Doing so in this context would be undesirable because the 
appropriate threshold likely varies considerably from one context to another. When the 
benefits of an invention are relatively small, an amount considerably less than one million 
dollars should perhaps be sufficient for patenting. See infra text following note 251. 
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The second approach is the inducement standard: innovations should be 
considered “easily discovered” if they would otherwise be devised and disclosed 
without the strong incentives of the patent system. This approach provides a 
guide for setting the level. It is sensitive to the context, and it recognizes that 
the word “obvious” in the statute encompasses achievements generated by 
ordinary economic forces where these achievements are “easily discovered.” A 
third approach is to determine ease in reference to the person of ordinary skill. 
This approach does not so much solve the problem of defining a standard as it 
does merely push the problem down the line. The approach becomes 
congruent with the second approach if the inducement standard is used to 
define the skills possessed by the person of ordinary skill. 
2. “Ordinary” Skill 
Graham’s inducement standard does provide a way to interpret the level of 
“ordinary skill.” It should be interpreted to be the level that would exist 
without the inducement of patents. That insight provides courts with a 
coherent and theoretically rigorous way to define the capabilities of the 
hypothetical person of ordinary skill while avoiding the difficulties we found 
with either endowing the person with omniscient knowledge and minimal 
creativity or with seeking to identify the relevant level of ordinary skill on the 
basis of a cognitive approach to nonobviousness.77 Defining the level of 
ordinary skill does not do all of the work of the inducement standard; we will 
still need to consider the motivations of people with this level of skill in the 
absence of patents to determine what would have happened absent patent 
protection. But it moves us much closer to an administrable doctrine with a 
normatively defensible foundation. 
The inducement standard thus offers an escape from the otherwise 
unanchored and potentially circular “reasonable person” test of the Patent Act, 
in much the same way that economic analysis provided content to the 
reasonable person test of tort law. The standard establishes a baseline that is 
independent of the patent system because it looks to the economic forces that 
would exist without patents. The person of “ordinary” skill is the person who 
would be in the industry even if the patent system did not exist, and an 
innovation should be considered “obvious” or “easily” discoverable if 
nonpatent incentives would be sufficient. 
The practical importance of this resolution can be understood by 
considering the application of the test in two fields: software and 
 
77.  See supra Subsection I.A.1. 
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pharmaceutical research. In both fields, the vast majority of actual practitioners 
are expected to be very creative. Under the inducement standard, however, 
ordinary skill is defined not by the average researcher whose position may 
depend on the incentives of patents but by the hypothetical practitioner who 
would exist in the field even without the inducement of patents. In many 
branches of the software industry, that hypothetical practitioner would still be 
very highly skilled and creative because the intellectual property protection of 
copyright would still provide firms with significant incentives to hire very 
smart software researchers and writers. The pharmaceutical industry provides 
a stark contrast because it is known to depend heavily on patent incentives to 
fund its research. Without the inducement of patents, pharmaceutical firms 
would perhaps hire some chemists to keep their production lines running, but 
they would not have the incentives to hire cutting-edge researchers. In short, 
all firms would look like current “generic” pharmaceutical firms, which 
generally do not conduct research into new pharmaceuticals. The level of 
“ordinary” skill in the pharmaceutical industry would thus be lower than the 
average skill of patent-seeking researchers currently in the field, but this result 
makes perfect sense under the inducement standard. Existing research 
pharmaceutical firms presumably try to hire only those researchers creative 
enough to secure patents. Patent law ought not look to the average skill level of 
these researchers and label them all ordinary because that approach would tend 
to undermine the very patents necessary to hire these researchers. 
3. The “Person” Who Possesses the Skill 
Further conceptual improvement can be made by understanding that a 
“person” can be conceived of not merely as an individual but also as a 
corporation or some other entity. An entity, of course, naturally includes 
different people offering different types of contributions, and in most cases it 
makes more economic sense to ask about the economic incentives that an entity 
would face absent patent inducement than to ask about the economic 
incentives of hypothetical individuals. With this clarification, the inducement 
standard asks not only what some individual blessed with economic common 
sense and a lab in the garage would do in a world without patent incentives, 
but also what entities would do. Inventions are often developed by teams of 
inventors, and thus it makes economic sense for the inducement standard to 
apply at more than the individual level. If, for example, no individual would 
pursue a project, but a group of individuals certainly would, even without 
patent incentives, then we should characterize the invention as patent-induced. 
This step furthers the project of making the person of ordinary skill less 
hypothetical; it is still hypothetical in the sense that it is “ordinary” and thus 
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operating without patent incentives, but no longer do we need to imagine a 
person with extraordinary capabilities. We need only consider what an entity 
would easily discover, using typical research protocols, given a particular 
incentive structure. 
It might appear that this change would require rewriting the statute. But 
the very first section of the United States Code, the Dictionary Act, provides: “In 
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates 
otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, 
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock 
companies, as well as individuals.”78 The failure of others to suggest that the 
Dictionary Act should be applied to the patent statute is likely a consequence, 
not a cause, of the existing judicial conception of the “person of ordinary skill” 
in cognitive rather than economic terms. Courts have not always followed the 
Dictionary Act;79 yet even commentators who are skeptical that the Dictionary 
Act should always be followed seem troubled only where applying the statute 
would conflict with other principles of interpretation.80 There may well be 
statutes—say, a typical murder statute—in which the Dictionary Act would not 
apply to the word “person.” But, as we have seen, there is already a 
longstanding tradition in patent law of treating the “person of ordinary skill” 
as a hypothetical rather than a real person, and the Dictionary Act provides a 
means of honoring the sense behind this tradition that a real person cannot be 
intended without doing violence to the statutory text. That an entity is a legal 
“person” is a commonplace,81 and it may be a particularly appropriate fiction 
once the obviousness doctrine is conceived in economic terms. Nothing in  
§ 103 suggests that “person” should exclude entities. 
C. Reconciling the Patentability Standard with General Regulatory Theory 
Embracing an economic approach such as the inducement standard while 
rejecting a purely cognitive approach to obviousness provides one final 
important benefit: it generates theoretical consistency between patent law and 
 
78.  1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
79.  See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
2085, 2121-24 (2002) (discussing judicial interpretation of the Dictionary Act). 
80.  See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2-3, at 124 n.1 (3d ed. 
2000) (cited and discussed in Rosenkranz, supra note 79, at 2117). 
81.  See generally Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach 
to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97 (2009) (examining the 
history and underpinnings of the law’s treatment of corporations as people). 
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a much broader range of federal regulatory law in which economic approaches 
are ubiquitous. 
A starting place is the federal common law of torts, where negligence has 
long been defined as conduct falling below the standard of care that would be 
followed by a reasonable person.82 Tort law is an especially good field for 
comparison to patent law in this context because tort law’s “reasonable person” 
has frequently been cited as a hypothetical construct that is analogous to the 
statutory “person having ordinary skill in the art” used in defining 
nonobviousness. One could imagine a cognitive approach to defining the care 
that would be employed by a reasonable person—for example, an approach 
asking how much care actual, average, or perhaps even hypothetical individuals 
would think of taking in particular circumstances. Yet courts have not taken 
such an approach for more than half a century. The set of decisions made by 
actual individuals—in other words, the customary level of care—is not the 
ultimate touchstone of negligence. Rather, the courts have overtly tied the 
standard of reasonable care to an economic calculus, most famously outlined in 
Learned Hand’s opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.83 
The obviousness doctrine of patent law could be distinguished from the 
negligence standard of federal tort law on the grounds that patent law is a 
statutory field, not an area of common law. In a common law field, judges have 
inherent law-making powers, while in statutory fields, judges are supposed to 
follow the policy dictates of statutory law as encoded by the legislature. Judicial 
importation of economic analysis into a common law field is thus less troubling 
than a similar step would be in a statutory field. Yet while the distinction 
between statutory and common law fields is significant in many contexts, it is 
not so here for two reasons. 
First, the nonobviousness requirement evolved first as a common law 
doctrine developed by the courts themselves.84 Congress’s codification of the 
requirement in 1952 is widely understood to be a legislative validation of the 
 
82.  See, e.g., Davidson Steamship Co. v. United States, 205 U.S. 187, 193 (1907) (“[T]here is an 
obligation on all persons to take the care which under the ordinary circumstances of the case 
a reasonable and prudent man would take, and the omission of that care constitutes 
negligence.”). 
83.  159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). See generally Chiang, supra note 9, at 43-46 (recounting the 
development of the common law of obviousness before codification); John F. Duffy, 
Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2007) (providing a 
history of the development of the obviousness doctrine). 
84.  A critical turning point in doctrinal development was the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850). 
  
the yale law journal  120: 159 0  2 011  
1618 
 
general thrust of the doctrine as it had been evolving in the courts.85 Indeed, 
the Supreme Court in Graham expressly held that the statutory 
nonobviousness requirement “was intended to codify judicial precedents.”86 
Where Congress endorses the general thrust of judicially created common law 
through codification, the resulting statute might well be interpreted as 
maintaining a significant role for further judicial development and refinement 
of the law. The obvious analogy comes from the other branch of federal 
monopoly law, antitrust law. The Supreme Court has expressly interpreted the 
Sherman Act as “drawing on common-law tradition”87 and has repeatedly held 
that, in interpreting that statute, the courts maintain a greater degree of 
policymaking power than they do with respect to other statutory enactments.88 
Second, even in the statutory arena, the federal courts have not balked at 
importing economic analysis into vaguely worded regulatory statutes. The 
antitrust laws again provide an obvious example. Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade,”89 and yet the Supreme Court soon imposed 
on the statute a reasonable gloss that was defined in economic terms.90 Like the 
Sherman Act, the Patent Act concerns the permissible (indeed, desirable) 
extent of monopolies in our economic system, and like the Sherman Act, the 
Patent Act is based on economic goals.91 While the Patent Act is more detailed 
 
85.  See Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as Replaced by Section 103 of the 1952 Patent 
Act, in NONOBVIOUSNESS: THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY, supra note 6, at  
1-400, 1-409; see also supra note 74 (discussing the legislative history of the 1952 codification 
of § 103). 
86.  Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966). 
87.  Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978); see also Leegin 
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (“From the beginning 
the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute.”). 
88.  See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899 (“Just as the common law adapts to modern understanding 
and greater experience, so too does the Sherman Act’s prohibition on ‘restraint[s] of trade’ 
evolve to meet the dynamics of present economic conditions.”). 
89.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
90.  See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60, 62 (1911) (announcing that a “standard 
of reason” or “rule of reason” was to be applied in enforcing the Sherman Act); see also id. at 
55, 58 (recognizing that the conceptions of unreasonable restraints on trade depend on 
“economic conceptions”). The Standard Oil Court’s imposition of an economic 
reasonableness test onto the Sherman Act was controversial. In dissent, Justice Harlan 
accused the Court majority of “judicial legislation” because it had decided “to insert the 
word ‘unreasonable’ in the act.” Id. at 90 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
91.  See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (noting that the constitutional “clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights” is based on an “economic 
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and specific than the Sherman Act and should not be interpreted to be merely 
an authorization for federal courts to create their own common law of patents 
(as the Sherman Act is in the field of antitrust), the greater specificity of the 
Patent Act should not prevent courts from interpreting the Act’s individual 
provisions in a manner consistent with larger regulatory theory. The Supreme 
Court has already imported economic analysis in interpreting the Copyright 
Act—in determining, for example, the extent of “fair use” that may be made of 
copyrighted works.92 More generally, modern regulatory statutes are typically 
interpreted to include economic analysis. While in many regulatory areas that 
interpretive gloss is supplied by the executive branch,93 the source of the 
interpretative gloss merely reflects Congress’s decision to allocate substantive 
lawmaking powers to administrative agencies in the modern regulatory state. 
Where Congress has not granted administrative agencies substantive 
lawmaking powers (as in the patent field), the courts need not eschew 
economic analysis. Rather, courts may properly recognize that, in numerous 
areas—ranging from pure common law (tort law), to areas of mixed statutory 
and common law (antitrust), to modern statutory administrative areas 
(environmental law94)—economic analysis is a broadly accepted interpretative 
gloss. 
Viewed in this larger context, Graham’s inducement standard, with its 
economic gloss on the statutory nonobviousness standard, is not in the least 
anomalous. The anomaly is the paucity of economic analysis in lower court 
 
philosophy . . . that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to 
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful 
Arts’”). 
92.  See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559, 566 n.9 (1985) 
(relying on economic theory in interpreting the permissible scope of fair use). While the 
statutory language of the current fair use statute, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006), includes at least 
one factor that points toward economic analysis (factor four, “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” id. § 107(4)), the statute itself is a 
codification of a judicial gloss imposed on the Copyright Act prior to any legislative 
recognition of fair use. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) 
(recognizing the statutory provision as a restatement of judicially created doctrine). 
93.  See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,736, § 1(b)(6) (1993) (requiring that, to 
the extent permitted by law, executive branch agencies should engage in cost-benefit 
analysis and should regulate only if the benefits of regulation exceed the costs); see also 
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009) (sustaining the EPA’s decision to 
require economic cost-benefit analysis in administering a statute that did not clearly forbid 
such analysis). 
94.  Barton H. Thompson, Jr., What Good Is Economics?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 175, 176 (2003) 
(“One cannot study environmental law today without encountering economic analyses. 
Economics is everywhere—in legislative hearings and debates, regulatory documents, 
judicial opinions, legal casebooks, and academic articles.”). 
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applications of the nonobviousness standard. An electronic search of all Federal 
Circuit decisions since 1982 found fewer than two dozen cases in which 
economic factors are even mentioned as part of a nonobviousness analysis.95 
Moreover, in the majority of those cases, the courts were distinguishing 
economic from technological factors and were holding that the economic 
factors were not relevant in determining nonobviousness. At most, the survey 
was able to identify only six cases in a quarter-century that had overtly applied 
economic analysis in deciding patent obviousness issues, and none of those 
cases had been decided in the last decade. This vacuum of economic analysis 
need not exist. Incorporating basic economic wisdom into patentability 
decisions would help harmonize patent law with the overarching thrust of 
regulatory law in many other fields. Graham’s inducement standard points the 
way toward that end. 
D. Implications of the Inducement Standard 
Our textual analysis above justifies the use of an economic rather than 
cognitive approach to the nonobviousness standard. This still leaves several 
questions about what the inducement standard would require, and we address 
three important questions here. 
1. Objectivity 
One question is whether the courts should ask whether the particular 
inventor would have invented without patent incentives or whether any 
 
95.  In the Lexis file of all Federal Circuit decisions, the following search was executed on 
February 14, 2010: “patent and econom! w/200 (obviou! or nonobviou!) and 
(overview(patent or patent!) or core-terms (patent or patent!)).” (The restrictions 
“(overview(patent or patent!) or core-terms (patent or patent!))” were designed to exclude 
any nonpatent cases.) The search yielded 68 cases. Those cases were independently coded 
by two coders into three categories: (1) false positives (that is, cases that did not involve any 
use of economic principles in obviousness analysis); (2) cases in which the courts 
distinguished economic factors from technological factors and held that economic factors 
were not relevant to obviousness analysis; and (3) cases in which courts were using 
economic factors as proxies or considerations for either obviousness or nonobviousness. Of 
the 68 cases, 52 cases were coded by at least one coder as false positives, and in 50 of those 
cases both coders agreed on the classification (intercoder agreement = 0.96). Sixteen of the 
cases were coded by at least one coder as falling within category (2), with agreement on 
coding in 12 of those cases (intercoder agreement = 0.75). Only 6 cases were classified by at 
least one coder as falling into category (3), and in only 2 cases did the coders agree on the 
classification (intercoder agreement = 0.33). None of the cases classified in category (3) by 
either coder was decided in the last decade. 
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inventor would have. Because Graham’s articulation of the inducement 
standard employs the passive voice (referring to the inventions that “would not 
be disclosed or devised”),96 the inducement standard could be read as 
subjective: would this inventor have devised and disclosed without the patent 
inducement? But the more natural reading of the passage, and the reading 
more justifiable on policy grounds,97 is an objective one. The passive voice 
employed in the sentence highlights the invention, not the inventor. The 
Graham Court appeared to favor the latter approach, an objective patentability 
standard,98 and an objective patentability standard is almost certainly 
compelled by the second sentence of § 103, which forbids reliance on the 
inventor’s actual inventive process as a ground for rejecting a patent.99 
Properly construed, the inducement standard looks objectively to determine 
whether any person would likely have devised and disclosed the invention 
without a patent inducement. 
 
96.  Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966). 
97.  A subjective inducement standard might be easier to administer because the PTO and the 
courts could look merely to historical facts about how a particular inventor derived the 
invention. Moreover, where an innovation is discovered merely by chance, without actually 
being motivated by the promise of a patent, it is unclear why society is better off rewarding 
the discovery with a patent. But see Sean B. Seymore, Serendipity, 88 N.C. L. REV. 185 (2009) 
(defending patentability of serendipitous inventions, while arguing that conception occurs 
after initial accident). 
Yet a subjective standard would have significant drawbacks. Courts and patent 
examiners would have to determine the mental state of individual inventors—a difficult task 
compounded by the inventor’s superior technical knowledge. Legally knowledgeable 
inventors could often feign additional efforts if they believed that their actual efforts in 
making the discovery might demonstrate that the invention was too subjectively obvious. 
Indeed, even in the case of a chance discovery, the patent applicant could delay seeking a 
patent while pretending to do additional experiments that are in fact unnecessary. An 
objective standard does not exclude the possibility that how hard the inventor worked may 
be indirectly relevant as evidence of how hard a problem was expected to be. See infra 
Subsection III.B.2. 
Finally, the choice in favor of an objective standard aligns patentability decisions with 
other areas of law that are designed to regulate economic behavior. Tort law, for example, 
applies an objective standard of reasonableness and generally affords the clumsy or 
inattentive no adjustment. See Susan Randall, Corrective Justice and the Torts Process, 27 IND. 
L. REV. 1, 19 (1993) (“[I]ndividuals who cannot conform to the standard of the reasonable 
person, as an unfortunate consequence of subnormal intellectual capacity or some other 
shortcoming, may be held liable for conduct which represents their best efforts.”). So, too, is 
the rule of reason in antitrust law based on an objective analysis of economic behavior. See 
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 671 (3d Cir. 1993). 
98.  383 U.S. at 15 n.7. 
99.  35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (“Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the 
invention was made.”). 
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2. Trade Secrecy and Disclosure 
Under the Court’s articulation of the inducement standard, an invention is 
patentable if it would not be devised or disclosed but for the inducement of a 
patent. For inventions that would not be created at all without the promise of a 
patent, it is easy to understand the social benefits of granting the patent. For 
inventions that would be created but held as trade secrets in the absence of the 
patent system, the social calculus is more complex. The position taken under 
the Graham standard—which permits patents on such inventions—might be 
open to question as a matter of policy, but it does make Graham’s inducement 
standard easier to reconcile with the statutory text. 
Consider, for example, an alternative inducement standard that allowed 
patenting only if the invention would not have been devised but for the 
inducement of the patent system, whether or not the invention was disclosed. 
If that standard were followed, whenever trade secrecy would provide adequate 
incentive by itself to make inventions, the inventions would be considered 
obvious and thus patent protection would be unavailable. The problem for this 
hypothetical alternative inducement standard is that, in certain circumstances, 
the incentives associated with trade secrecy protection are strong.100 Indeed, 
trade secrecy protection can theoretically provide even more powerful 
incentives than patents because trade secrecy rights are potentially infinite in 
duration. Because of those incentives, some innovations induced by trade 
secrecy may have been difficult to discover, and thus courts are likely to view 
them to be not obvious according to some basic, commonsense interpretation 
of the statutory language.101 
The actual inducement standard endorsed by the Graham Court does not, 
however, suffer from this problem. Graham’s inducement standard requires 
innovations to be viewed as unpatentable only if they would be created and 
shared without any patent inducement. Such innovations are likely to be 
relatively easy—meaning inexpensive—to create because such an inventor must 
 
100.  See, e.g., David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public 
Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 157 (2007) (“Because a trade secret lasts, at least in theory, 
as long as a trade secret holder maintains its secrecy, the possibility that the information will 
never enter the public domain is very real.”). 
101.  The alternative inducement standard would also seemingly require decisionmakers to 
investigate the extent to which inventions could be kept secret, with patents denied to 
inventions that were capable of being held in secret. In a sense, the alternative inducement 
standard would make secrecy the preferred policy, with patenting allowed only if the 
incentives associated with trade secrecy are inadequate. That approach would seem to be 
contrary to longstanding patent precedent and present another hurdle for reconciling the 
statutory text with the alternative inducement standard. 
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find the means of recouping the investment made in an innovation that anyone 
can freely copy. Thus, the position on trade secrecy taken by the Graham 
inducement standard narrows any potential gap between the inducement 
standard and the statutory text: if an innovation is sufficiently difficult that no 
one would engage in the creative activity absent the possibility of either trade 
secret or patent protection, then the invention should not be viewed as easily 
discovered or “obvious.” The end result is also sensible: where an invention is 
sufficiently difficult that the incentives of either trade secrecy or the patent 
system are needed to induce its creation, the law will permit protection of the 
invention under either regime. 
A more challenging policy critique of the Graham standard would suggest 
that it might sometimes make it too easy to patent. Consider a situation in 
which technological information is easily developed and known by multiple 
firms in an industry, but in which each firm would protect the information as a 
trade secret because there is no benefit from public disclosure. Granting 
patents on such technological information is consistent with the “exchange for 
secrets” theory, a venerable (if historically controversial) rationale for 
patents.102 But this theory is a better justification for permitting patents to 
cover information that would otherwise be held in secret by a single firm. 
Allowing patents on widely held secrets imposes more social costs (because it 
halts preexisting competitive use of the information) and fewer benefits 
(because placing information in the public domain is likely to provide little 
social benefit where most or all parties who could make use of the information 
previously had access to it). But this problem in any event is not severe. 
Typically, easily developed information is likely to spill out of trade secrecy and 
enter the public domain long before a twenty-year patent would place the 
technology in the public domain. So it would only be a small group of 
inventions—for which there is some reason to believe that no such spillover 
would occur—for which the inducement standard would give excessive 
protection. 
3. Nonpatent Inducements for Innovation 
Graham’s inducement might, in contrast, also be viewed as establishing too 
stringent of an obviousness standard where the nonpatent inducements for 
innovation are especially powerful. Consider, for example, a situation where 
 
102.  David G. Luettgen, Functional Usefulness vs. Communicative Usefulness: Thin Copyright 
Protection for the Nonliteral Elements of Computer Programs, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 233, 261-
62 (1996) (explaining the rationale of this theory and its tension with justifications for 
patent law). 
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the government, a foundation, or a wealthy philanthropist offers a prize (or a 
subsidy or grant) for creating and disclosing a particular type of advance—for 
example, for a better treatment for a particular disease.103 Assume that the prize 
is sufficiently large that it spurs teams of top researchers to seek the innovation. 
After years of hard work, one team succeeds, claims the prize, and seeks a 
patent. Such an innovation would seem difficult or impossible to label 
“obvious” in any linguistic sense. Yet an argument might be made that the 
patent should be denied under the inducement standard because the powerful 
incentives created by the prize would have led to the innovation being devised 
and disclosed even without the possibility of a patent. 
Much turns, however, on the conditions under which the prize or subsidy 
is granted. Federal research subsidies are now typically granted under the rule, 
codified in legislation, that grant recipients will be able to seek patents on the 
fruits of their federally funded research.104 The possibility of a patent likely will 
affect the amount and intensity of the grantee’s research and thus can be 
viewed as a proximate cause of the innovation. The inducement standard 
would then not be a significant barrier to patenting. Indeed, since the 
inducement of a possible patent existed prior to any offer for a prize, the 
hypothetical suggests that the invention was so difficult to achieve that it could 
not be devised or disclosed but for the inducement of a patent plus other 
incentives. Even if it could be shown in a particular case that a particular 
federally funded invention would have been invented at about the same time 
without the patent incentive, there is a strong argument for reading the Bayh-
Dole Act in conjunction with the patent statute to allow patentability if the 
combination of the patent incentive and federal funding sufficiently accelerated 
the invention. 
If the government, foundation, or philanthropist wants to preclude 
patenting, then the award of a grant or prize could be conditioned on the 
grantee or winner dedicating the patent rights to the public domain.105 This 
arrangement, however, poses no special problem for the inducement standard. 
 
103.  See, e.g., Prize for the Development of New Treatments for Chagas Disease, KNOWLEDGE 
ECOLOGY INT’L, http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/b_b_igwg/prop2_chagas_prize.pdf 
(last visited June 9, 2010) (proposing a prize for new treatments of a particular disease). 
104.  See Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (allowing nonprofit and small business entities to 
retain title to any “subject invention,” which is defined in § 201(e) to encompass any 
invention created “in the performance of work under a [federal] funding agreement”). 
105.  Alternatively, the prize sponsor could allow patenting but require that any resulting product 
be sold at a low price. See, e.g., AIDAN HOLLIS & THOMAS POGGE, INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL 
HEALTH, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MAKING NEW MEDICINES ACCESSIBLE FOR ALL 3 (2008) 
(describing rules of the Health Impact Fund that would require specified prices for prize 
recipients), available at http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/igh/hif_book.pdf. 
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The conditioned grant or prize looks largely identical to standard employment 
contracts in for-profit firms, which award workers with money (in the form of 
a salary and other benefits) in exchange for, inter alia, an assignment of patent 
rights in any inventions created at work.106 Because the patentability standard 
is objective, it cannot matter whether the individual actually seeking the patent 
intends to assign the rights (in exchange for a salary) to a firm for commercial 
exploitation or to assign the rights (in exchange for a grant or prize) to the 
public domain. 
Nonetheless, while grants and prizes do not usually present a situation in 
which the inducement standard produces results divergent from an intuitive 
sense of “obviousness,” we do not discount the possibility that the inducement 
standard could produce such results in some circumstances. Sometimes even 
nonpatent incentives such as tenure hopes might clearly have been sufficient 
for some inventions. Indeed, the existence of such incentives might be 
particularly likely to render patent protection unnecessary to induce invention 
after a supply shock makes invention much easier or a demand shock makes 
invention much more useful.107 The inducement standard is most congruent 
with an intuitive sense of “obviousness” where the nonpatent inducements are 
relatively weak in comparison to the patent inducement. If the nonpatent 
inducements are powerful, then those inducements may spur the creation of 
relatively difficult inventions. At least for the general run of cases, the PTO and 
courts should focus on and apply the inducement standard because it is 
supported by Supreme Court precedent, it provides a compelling economic 
justification for granting patents in some circumstances and denying them in 
others, and it gives specific intuitions for how to administer the obviousness 
doctrine, as we will show in Part III. 
i i .  refining the inducement standard 
Graham’s inducement standard lends itself to economic analysis because it 
focuses on the incentives provided by patents. The question of whether the 
invention would not have been “disclosed or devised but for the inducement of 
a patent” demands an inquiry into (1) the economic incentives or inducements 
that would exist without the patent and (2) the expected economic costs of 
generating the invention. Where there would be sufficient inducements to 
 
106.  The Netflix Prize similarly required that the winner provide Netflix a royalty-free license. 
See The Netflix Prize Rules, NETFLIX, http://www.netflixprize.com/rules (last visited June 7, 
2010). 
107.  See infra Section II.B. 
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cover the costs of generating invention even absent patent protection, a patent 
would entail costs and no benefit. Yet while the inducement standard provides 
that basic economic intuition, the standard needs to be refined or clarified in at 
least three important respects. Not surprisingly, these three refinements 
concern fundamental issues in patent policy: time, competition, and the 
meaning of “invention.” 
A. Time 
Time is one of the most important features in the patent system. Patents 
are relatively short property rights, and parties often engage in intense 
competition known as patent racing to be the first in time to obtain a patent.108 
Whether “first in time” is defined by reference to the date of invention or the 
date of application filing matters not for these purposes.109 More generally, the 
patent system is frequently modeled as a system designed to produce not more 
innovation but earlier innovation.110 
Yet despite the importance of time to the patent system, Graham articulates 
an atemporal inducement standard. Plainly, the standard has to be modified to 
take time into account. The basic insights here are straightforward. If the 
prospect of a patent induces invention to occur twenty years or more before it 
otherwise would have occurred, then the issuance of the patent is 
unambiguously desirable (assuming, of course, that the invention is socially 
valuable111). With the inducement of the patent, society has the technology at 
an earlier time (albeit under exclusive rights). After the expiration of the patent 
(which we will assume to last for twenty years), the technology enters the 
 
108.  See generally JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 399-400 (1988) 
(discussing potential costs and benefits of patent races); Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly 
of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 85-86 (2009) (assessing the efficiency of 
racing); Glenn C. Loury, Market Structure and Innovation, 93 Q.J. ECON. 395 (1979) (offering 
a model of the dynamics of patent races); Suzanne Scotchmer, Incentives To Innovate, in THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 273, 275 (Peter Newman ed., 
1998) (summarizing competing conclusions in the literature). 
109.  See generally Toshiko Takenaka, Rethinking the United States First-To-Invent Principle from a 
Comparative Law Perspective: A Proposal To Restructure § 102 Novelty and Priority Provisions, 39 
HOUS. L. REV. 621 (2002) (critiquing the United States’s acceptance of the first-to-invent 
principle and arguing for specific changes). 
110.  See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 444 
(2004) (noting that one advantage of earlier invention is that inventions fall into the public 
domain sooner). 
111.  The patent system generally does not consider the social desirability of an invention. See 
Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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public domain at the same time as or earlier than it otherwise would have if 
there had been no patent inducement. At the other extreme, a patent is almost 
certainly undesirable where it induces invention to be devised and disclosed 
only a day or two earlier than would otherwise have occurred without the 
patent inducement. Society is then burdened with having the technology exist 
under exclusive rights for a long period of time, although society would have 
obtained the technology free of exclusive rights very soon even without the 
patent inducement. Between those two extremes, there can be reasonable 
debate about the precise amount of temporal acceleration needed to justify a 
patent. 
For our immediate purposes, we may leave that temporal period vaguely 
defined by requiring the inducement of a patent to accelerate invention by a 
substantial period of time, where substantiality is some period of years. 
Extreme patent skeptics might put that period close to twenty years. Patent 
enthusiasts could reasonably argue that, if the inducement of a patent advances 
the arrival of technology by only a few years, society is better off having the 
earlier arrival of the technology even though the deadweight losses associated 
with the patent will continue for many more years. In principle, “substantial” 
should be defined as the amount of time for which the social benefits of the 
invention’s existing for that time period are equal to the social costs of patent 
protection for the patent term minus that period. As we will soon see, a precise 
numeric definition of that period of time is less necessary than it may first 
seem. 
An excellent case to illustrate this temporal refinement of the inducement 
standard is the brilliant—yet, in our view, ultimately wrong—opinion by Judge 
Posner in the panel decision from Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.112 Posner’s 
panel opinion is the only reported court of appeals case that has ever attempted 
to apply Graham’s inducement standard. Posner recognized that the standard 
needed temporal adjustment. He reasoned: “The framers of the Constitution 
and the Patent Code would not have wanted patents to be granted where the 
invention would have been made anyway, and about as soon, without any hope 
of patent protection.”113 Where the invention would be made “about as soon” 
without a patent inducement, Posner understood that the patent “would confer 
no benefits that might offset the costs of monopoly.”114 He identified the 
obviousness doctrine as the correct doctrinal vehicle to deny patents in such 
circumstances, and for good measure, he cited Graham as well as Kitch’s article 
 
112.  697 F.2d 796 (7th Cir.), vacated en banc, 723 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1983). 
113.  Id. at 797. 
114.  Id. 
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on obviousness—the leading judicial and academic authorities to endorse the 
inducement standard.115 So far, Posner’s reasoning mirrors our own approach. 
Then Posner turned to applying the inducement standard. The invention 
before the court was famous.116 It was a “quick-release” socket wrench—a 
wrench that allowed the user to push a button to release the socket attached to 
the wrench.117 Socket wrenches were very old in the art. Also very old was the 
idea that a socket head could be attached to the wrench by a spring-loaded ball 
bearing and that the wrench could encompass some releasing mechanism.118 
Peter Roberts, the inventor, set out to fix what he saw as a problem with the 
existing designs: releasing the socket from the wrench was “difficult . . . 
particularly when the sockets are small and the user’s hands are greasy.”119 
Roberts’s novel quick-release mechanism provided a button, typically on the 
top of the wrench (see Figure 1), that would quickly and easily release the ball 
bearing “so that it no longer holds the socket, which then can be easily 
withdrawn from the [wrench] or in fact can actually fall off . . . due to 
gravity.”120 The release button was positioned so that it could be easily pushed 
by the same hand used to hold the wrench. 
 
115.  See Kitch, supra note 12; supra text accompanying note 12. 
116.  For mainstream media coverage of the David-versus-Goliath case that grew out of the 
invention, see Sears Loses Patent Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1982, at 32; Wrenching Sears, TIME, 
Oct. 23, 1978, at 46, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 
0,9171,946093,00.html. 
117.  Quick Release for Socket Wrenches, U.S. Patent No. 3,208,318 (filed Apr. 24, 1964) (issued 
Sept. 28, 1965). 
118.  See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 1,660,989 (filed Jan. 27, 1927) (issued Feb. 28, 1928) (disclosing 
both the use of a ball bearing to secure the socket head and a mechanism, albeit an awkward 
one, for releasing the socket). 
119.  ’ 318 Patent, at col.1 ll.14-16. 
120.  Id. at col.1 ll.21-24. 
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Figure 1. 
roberts’s quick-release socket wrench 
 
The ball bearing (18) is used to lock the socket head in place, as was typical in 
preexisting socket wrenches. In Roberts’s wrench, pushing the button (22) allows the 
ball bearing to move into the notch (26) and thereby to release the socket head.  
 
Posner acknowledged that Roberts had made a “genuine” contribution in 
designing “a device in which [the preexisting] ideas worked smoothly to enable 
sockets to be changed easily with one hand.”121 But that contribution “was 
entitled to patent protection only if it was the kind of contribution unlikely to 
be induced except by the promise of a monopoly, and we do not think it was 
that kind of invention, because we think it would have been made anyway, and 
soon.”122 Once again, Posner appropriately adjusted the inducement standard 
 
121.  Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 697 F.2d 796, 798 (7th Cir.), vacated en banc, 723 F.2d 1324 
(7th Cir. 1983). 
122.  Id. at 798. 
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to account for time: the invention should be viewed as obvious only if it would 
have been made “soon” without the inducement of a patent. 
But how did Judge Posner know that Roberts’s invention would have been 
made “soon”? The invention was “simplicity itself,” and “its essential elements 
were well known when it was invented.”123 Posner noted that “Gonzalez and 
Carpenter separately had patented socket wrenches that had the essential 
elements of the Roberts patent; true, the emphasis was on the locking rather 
than the release function, but these are reciprocals.”124 Thus, in Posner’s view, 
all that needed to be done was for a person skilled in the art to recognize that a 
“reciprocal” of existing elements was needed. Posner concluded that such a 
recognition was likely to happen quickly: 
Everyone knew there was a market for a quick-release wrench; everyone 
knew the elements of such a wrench . . . . It was just a question of 
coming up with a workable embodiment of these ideas, a task for which 
no special training, expensive equipment, or prolonged testing and 
refining were necessary.125 
Yet there is one glaring oddity about Posner’s reasoning: though he 
correctly modified the inducement standard to account for time, he otherwise 
did not mention time at all in his opinion. All of the prior art patents were cited 
by the inventor’s name only, without reference to either the patent issuance 
number or date.126 If dates are added to the prior patents, we discover that the 
Carpenter patent—the patent that Posner heralded as having all the essential 
elements needed to make Roberts’s invention—was issued in 1928, three and a 
half decades prior to the time of Roberts’s invention.127 In expressing 
confidence that, even without the inducement of a patent, the elements of the 
1928 Carpenter patent could be modified “soon” to produce a quick-release 
wrench, Judge Posner offered nothing more than ipse dixit contradicted by 
history: no one in the art had been able to make the necessary changes for an 
extremely long time, and the one person who was able to do it—Roberts—
seems to have been induced by a possibility of a patent.128 While other pieces of 
 
123.  Id. at 797. 
124.  Id. at 797-98. 
125.  Id. at 798. 
126.  See, e.g., id. at 797-98 (referring to the “Roberts patent” and comparing it to “DePew,” 
“Gonzalez,” “Carpenter,” and “Wilson”). 
127.  See U.S. Patent No. 1,660,989 (filed Jan. 27, 1927) (issued Feb. 28, 1928). 
128.  In 1963, Roberts spent about six months designing his improved wrench and developing a 
prototype. See Roberts, 697 F.2d at 797. He submitted his prototype to Sears in May of 1964, 
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prior art cited in Posner’s opinion were closer in time to Roberts’s invention, 
the opinion did not maintain that any of those pieces of art contained 
additional elements or ideas that were not already in the 1928 Carpenter 
patent.129 
The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that Posner’s panel opinion was 
wrong to rule Roberts’s wrench invalid as a matter of law.130 Overturning the 
panel’s flawed reasoning was amply justified, but the en banc court also went 
out of its way to disavow Posner’s modified inducement standard.131 The en 
banc court’s rejection of his analysis led Judge Posner to write a dissenting 
opinion that, in addition to repeating his earlier analysis, also chastised the 
majority for refusing to apply economic analysis to the problem. “[L]awyers 
and judges,” Posner wrote, may seem to find “the language of economics 
repulsive. Yet the policies that have given shape to the patent statute are 
quintessentially economic, and the language of economics is therefore the 
natural language in which to articulate the test for obviousness.”132 Once again, 
we agree entirely with Posner’s general approach, and we also agree that the en 
banc majority did not “succeed[] very well in articulating an alternative test.”133 
But Judge Posner’s poor application of the economic test, resulting in the 
invalidation of a patent on an invention that intuitively seems extraordinarily 
clever, may have alienated the en banc court and, in the process, given the 
inducement approach a bad name. In our view, the en banc court should have 
rejected only Posner’s application of the inducement standard, not the 
 
one month after filing his patent application. Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 573 F.2d 976, 
978 (7th Cir. 1978). The sequence of events strongly suggests that Roberts spent time 
creating the invention in the hope of obtaining a patent and then marketing the patent to 
Sears. 
129.  In reverse chronological order, the other pieces of prior art considered by Posner were:  
(1) the Gonzales patent, U.S. Patent No. 3,172,675 (filed Feb. 19, 1963) (issued Mar. 9, 
1965), which, like the Carpenter patent, provided a mechanism for holding and locking in 
sockets; (2) the De Pew patent, U.S. Patent No. 3,069,191 (filed Apr. 13, 1961) (issued Dec. 
18, 1962), which did not discuss wrenches at all but instead was a device for holding loads 
being lifted by “winch or other power means”; and (3) the Wendling patent, U.S. Patent 
No. 2,987,334 (filed June 22, 1959) (issued June 6, 1961), which was a tool holder with an 
“interlock mechanism which positively prevents accidental disengagement thereof.” None of 
these pieces of prior art even attempted to address the problem of building a “quick release” 
mechanism. 
130.  The en banc court remanded the case for a new trial because the district court had submitted 
the case to the jury in a procedurally flawed manner. See Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
723 F.2d 1324, 1343 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc). 
131.  Id. at 1329 n.5. 
132.  Id. at 1347. 
133.  Id. 
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inducement standard itself or an economically based test. Given the failure of 
the literature and case law to point out the relevance of the timing of prior 
art,134 however, the en banc court’s approach was at least understandable. The 
en banc court’s approach reflected a common, though mistaken, intuition that 
the inducement standard cannot be applied in a principled or consistent way.135 
B. Competition 
Patent rights are distributed through a competition to be first in time, and 
that competition has implications for the inducement standard. Competition is 
most likely to speed invention when both the costs of innovation and the value 
of patent rights are relatively stable. Where this is so, competition to obtain the 
patent should advance the time of innovation by long periods, provided that 
the patent confers significantly greater market protection than can be obtained 
otherwise. To demonstrate this point, we here construct a model of invention 
that relies on a few straightforward assumptions about invention and 
competition. Though simple, the model illustrates the circumstances under 
which the time of innovation will depend little on whether there is a patent 
system. Our model will support several conclusions: (1) where the cost of 
innovation is falling rapidly, patents ordinarily should not issue, as inventors 
would likely have strong incentives to invent within a short period of time;  
(2) where the cost of innovation is constant or falling slowly, patents are more 
likely to be justified because the patent incentive will generally lead to 
invention long before it would have occurred with nonpatent first mover 
advantages; (3) where nonpatent incentives to invent are much greater, patent 
inducement is less likely and thus patents are less likely to be justified;  
(4) where market demand unexpectedly increases greatly shortly before 
invention, patents are less likely to be justified; and (5) where an invention will 
not be useful for some time, perhaps because supporting technologies are not 
yet sufficiently advanced, patents probably will not be justified because earlier 
innovation is not socially beneficial. The most difficult cases are those in which 
the patent incentive accelerates invention for a substantial period that is 
nonetheless substantially shorter than the patent term. 
Four assumptions are necessary to create the model. First, the process of 
innovation has a cost, which may decrease with time. The assumption that 
 
134.  See John F. Duffy, A Timing Approach to Patentability, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 343, 357-61 
(2008) (identifying other cases that failed to take proper account of the timing of 
inventions). 
135.  See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text; infra Part III. 
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innovation has some cost should not be difficult to defend. If innovations were 
costless, then the patent system would be difficult to justify because innovation 
would simply happen, like manna descending from the heavens.136 The 
decreasing cost of invention also accords with basic notions of progress. Past 
advances in technology provide necessary predicates, insights, and tools that 
make subsequent advances easier. 
Second, innovations have some positive value that may increase with time. 
This potential growth in the value of an innovation can be justified by the 
increasing size of markets and the gradual accumulation of wealth. 
Alternatively, an innovation could increase in value because complementary 
technologies or markets arise. For example, a method of speeding check-out 
procedures for online transactions might become considerably more valuable 
after cheaper bandwidth leads to an explosion in the number of Internet users. 
Third, part of an innovation’s social value can be captured by the innovator 
through either patents or nonpatent, non-trade-secret mechanisms, such as 
first-mover advantages, copyrights, or trademarks. We exclude trade secrecy 
from the alternative mechanisms for capturing part of an invention’s value 
because, as previously explained, Graham’s inducement standard looks to 
whether the innovation would be devised and disclosed without patent 
incentives.137 We also assume that a patent allows an innovator to capture a 
larger fraction of an innovation’s value than would the nonpatent, non-trade-
secret mechanisms alone. Obviously, if patents and nonpatent incentives are 
similar in size, innovation will not be retarded by denying patent protection. 
Fourth and most importantly, we assume that competition for 
innovations—either patent racing or competition to be the first in the market—
will allow innovation to occur when the portion of the innovation’s value that 
can be privately appropriated just equals and begins to exceed the cost of 
developing the innovation.138 This is a standard assumption in industrial 
 
136.  See Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348, 354 (1968) 
(noting that technical change “does not descend on us like manna” and that for any 
regulatory system, encouraging technical change must take into account the resources 
needed to generate such change). 
137.  See supra Subsection I.D.3. 
138.  A more elaborate assumption would recognize that success might occur only with some 
probability. In that case, an attempt at innovation will occur only when the expected costs 
are equal to the expected benefits, discounting for the possibility of failure. See Duffy, supra 
note 110, at 480-82 (offering a model in which attempts to invent have only probabilistic 
success); see also Mark T.L. Sargent, Economics Upside-Down: Low-Price Guarantees as 
Mechanisms for Facilitating Tacit Collusion, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2076 n.102 (1993) (noting 
that “the assumption of zero economic profits for the industry does not imply that each firm 
is earning zero economic profits”). 
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organization models139 and follows from the more general assumption that 
firms maximize wealth. Competition is therefore essential to determining the 
timing of innovation. 
Figure 2 justifies our conclusion that patents ordinarily should not issue 
when the cost of the innovation is declining dramatically. The cost—
represented by the solid, nearly vertical line dropping toward zero—is assumed 
to decline at a rate of ninety-five percent per year near a particular point in time 
(represented arbitrarily as the year 2020). The dot-solid, dot-dashed, and 
dotted lines are, respectively, the private value of the innovation if it is  
(1) protected by a patent (which is assumed to allow the capture of twenty 
years of rents on the innovation), (2) protected by a two-year first-mover 
advantage, and (3) protected by a one-year first-mover advantage (which is 
equivalent to the rents per year from the innovation).  
The situation portrayed in Figure 2 is a stark case where the issuance of a 
patent should not be viewed as meeting Graham’s inducement standard. 
Without the inducement of a patent, the innovation would be devised and 
disclosed just a few months into the year 2020, where the cost line is 
intersected by the dot-dash line (if nonpatent incentives equal two years of 
rents), or by the dotted line (if nonpatent incentives equal a single year of 
rents). With the inducement of a patent, the innovation would be devised and 
disclosed just shortly before 2020 (where the dot-solid line intersects the cost 
line). If such an innovation were protected by a patent, society would bear the 
costs of twenty years of patent protection for almost no gain. Worse still, from 
the standpoint of social welfare, the promise of patent protection may induce 
an intense race to be first so that many times the social resources needed to 
achieve the innovation would be expended in order to obtain the innovation 
just a few months earlier. These conclusions are relatively insensitive to 
changes in other assumptions.140  
 
139.  See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 STAN. 
L. REV. 1017, 1025 n.28 (1982) (“In equilibrium in a competitive industry marginal firms earn 
zero ‘economic’ profits and positive accounting profits. Their accounting profits include 
both a return to the equity capital invested in the firm, reflecting the opportunity cost of that 
capital, and the value of the entrepreneurs’ time.”). 
140.  In the graph depicted, the discount rate (interest rate) is assumed to be 6% and the market 
growth rate is assumed to be 4%. A patent would induce innovation only a few months 
earlier if the discount and growth rates fall anywhere within a range of 0% to 20%. 
  
the inducement standard of patentability 
1635 
 
Figure 2.  
innovation cost shock 
 
The costs of innovation are falling at 95% per year. Patent protection would induce 
innovation a few months prior to the time of innovation without patent protection. 
 
By contrast, Figures 3, 4, and 5 show cases where the cost of innovation is 
not falling dramatically in time but all other parameters are the same as in 
Figure 2. These figures help explain why patents should generally issue in this 
case. In these cases, patent protection can induce earlier innovation by fifty 
years, where the cost of innovation is constant (in Figure 3); by just a little 
more than twenty years, where the cost of innovation is falling 6% per year (in 
Figure 4); or by about eight years, where the cost of innovation is falling by 
20% per year (in Figure 5). The grant of the patent is unambiguously beneficial 
in Figures 3 and 4 because the patent advances the arrival of the technology by 
a period longer than, or about equal to, the patent life. Thus, the grant of the 
patent induces the invention sooner and either enriches, or at least does not 
diminish, the public domain. The situation shown in Figure 5 is a more 
difficult case as a matter of public policy. The innovation arrives substantially 
earlier with patent protection, but the patent’s exclusive rights extend into a 
period when society could have had the innovation without any patent 
protection. Even though there is some tradeoff in this region, eight years might 
well still seem to satisfy the refined inducement standard, which permits 
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patents except where the innovation would be devised and disclosed soon in 
the absence of patent protection. 
 
Figure 3. 
constant cost of innovation 
 
The cost of innovation is constant. Patent protection would induce innovation fifty 
years prior to the time of innovation with a two-year first-mover advantage but no 
patent protection. 
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Figure 4. 
slowly declining innovation costs 
 
The cost of innovation is falling slowly (6% per year). Patent protection would induce 
innovation twenty years prior to the time of innovation without patent protection. 
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Figure 5. 
moderately fast decline in innovation costs 
 
The cost of innovation is falling moderately quickly (20% per year). Patent protection 
would induce innovation several years prior to the time of innovation without patent 
protection. 
 
Figures 2 through 5 assume that nonpatent incentives were equal to two 
years’ worth of rents on the innovation. Such nonpatent incentives could come 
from first-mover advantages, trademarks, copyright protection, or some other 
mechanism. If the nonpatent incentives are greater, the gap between the time 
of invention with and without patent incentives narrows, and patent protection 
is less successful in inducing innovation substantially earlier than it would 
otherwise be. Conversely, if the nonpatent incentives are smaller (for example, 
where technology is easily copied and any first-mover advantage is slight), then 
the temporal gap widens. The former point is illustrated in Figure 6, which 
assumes that nonpatent incentives are equal to five years’ worth of rents on the 
innovation and otherwise reflects the same assumptions as Figure 4. Patents 
now induce innovation approximately twelve years instead of twenty years 
earlier. The results obtained from varying the strength of nonpatent incentives 
highlight the importance of courts’ considering nonpatent incentives in 
implementing the inducement standard,141 but also shows that patents can 
 
141.  See supra Subsection I.D.2. 
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substantially accelerate invention even where nonpatent incentives at early 
invention are considerable. 
Figure 6. 
slowly declining innovation costs with nonpatent incentives equal to five 
years of rents 
 
The cost of innovation is falling slowly (6% per year), and nonpatent incentives equal 
five years’ worth of rents. Patent protection would induce innovation twelve years 
prior to the time of innovation without patent protection. 
 
Another circumstance to be investigated is where the market for an 
innovation expands dramatically, as shown in Figure 7. The size of rents 
associated with the innovation is the heavy line rising dramatically after 2020; 
the other parameters are assumed to be changing at moderate levels, with the 
cost of invention declining at 6% and the discount rate holding at 6% through 
the period. At first glance, this scenario appears to satisfy the inducement 
standard or at least the inducement standard as modified to account for time, 
as the patent incentive causes the innovation to be devised and disclosed by 
patenting more than a decade earlier. Yet looks are deceiving here. While the 
innovation is patented at an early time, the use of the innovation—the actual 
practical benefit of the innovation—does not occur until much later. In this 
numeric example, while patenting occurs approximately in 2005, the 
innovation is not capable of any significant use until 2021 or 2022 (perhaps 
because some crucial piece of complementary technology is not yet available). 
As the innovation becomes capable of use—as the market for the innovation 
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grows—nonpatent incentives would induce creation and disclosure. In the 
example, this occurs in 2021. 
Figure 7. 
market shock scenario 
 
The market for innovation experiences exponential growth from 2020-2025, while cost 
of innovation is falling slowly (6% per year). Patent rights induce innovation long 
before innovation is useful in the market. 
 
The scenario depicted in Figure 7 may, moreover, be overly optimistic in 
favor of patents. Allowing a patent will have little social benefit, because the 
patent merely induces innovation at a time when it is not yet useful, but 
granting the patent might seem to have little social cost: the patent will expire 
relatively soon after the time when the innovation begins to be used in the 
market. A more realistic account, however, would recognize that someone 
patenting inventions years before those inventions may be useful faces great 
uncertainty about which patents ultimately will be useful.142 Many early 
patents will cover inventions that turn out to be worth little or nothing because 
of market or technological developments in the interim. Thus, the cost of 
developing a patent on an invention that will be useful years in the future 
 
142.  See generally Christopher A. Cotropia, Describing Patents as Real Options, 34 J. CORP. L. 1127 
(2009) (exploring the implications of recognizing the option value of patents). 
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should be adjusted to take into account the costs of patenting other inventions 
that turn out to be commercially useless. These costs will be greater the further 
in advance of possible commercialization patenting occurs. Figure 8 models 
this by assuming that the cost of innovation declines by 40% per year, as 
awareness of what inventions will be commercially useful increases. 
Figure 8. 
scenario involving market shock and rapidly falling innovation cost 
 
The market for innovation experiences exponential growth from 2020 to 2025, while 
cost of innovation is falling rapidly (40% per year). Patent rights induce innovation 
long before innovation is useful in the market, and the patent remains in force many 
years after the innovation would have been created and disclosed without the patent 
inducement. 
 
With these assumptions, patent protection will induce the innovation at a 
time closer to when the need arises, though still substantially before the 
innovation would be created absent patent protection. In the example, 
patenting will induce the innovation in 2012, and then the patent will last until 
2032. The patent will thus extend several years after the technology has 
matured, the innovation is widely used, and the rents associated with the 
patent are high. The social benefit of the earlier innovation is minimal, and the 
competition to obtain the patent succeeds only in pushing back the time of 
innovation to a point when producing the invention is unnecessarily expensive 
because of the uncertainty about whether it will be useful. 
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In sum, the competition to innovate should mean that, if the rewards 
associated with twenty years of patent exclusivity are much greater than 
nonpatent rewards, then patents will generally be successful in inducing 
innovation at a much earlier time. That general conclusion is subject to one 
important exception and one important caveat. The exception occurs where the 
cost of inventing is falling rapidly. In that circumstance, patent protection may 
not advance the time of innovation much. This exception produces the 
important insight that was missing from Judge Posner’s analysis in Roberts. 
Patents are most likely to fail the inducement standard where the innovation 
has recently become obvious—that is, where the costs of innovating have 
recently and dramatically declined. Perhaps Judge Posner’s intuition was that 
mechanical patents are generally obvious, but in fact the relative lack of 
successful improvements to standard mechanical tools tends to point to 
nonobviousness. 
The final caveat is that even where the patent does succeed in inducing 
much earlier innovation, the early innovation may be socially worthless if the 
innovation will not be marketed for some time. This caveat leads us to our 
third refinement of Graham’s inducement standard—that the inducement 
standard must focus not merely on whether the patent induces earlier creation 
of new information but on whether the patent can be expected to induce earlier 
invention in practical terms. We now turn to that point. 
C. Invention 
The Graham standard seeks to identify “those inventions” that are patent-
induced. But what is meant by “invention”? The Supreme Court has 
sometimes stated that “[t]he disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid 
pro quo of the right to exclude.’”143 That formulation might suggest that the 
mere paper disclosure in a patent application should be viewed as an 
“invention” for purposes of applying the inducement standard: if the promise 
of a patent yields a filed patent application years before the invention would 
have been created without any patent inducement, then perhaps the 
inducement standard should be viewed as satisfied. 
Yet while some Supreme Court pronouncements focus on disclosure of 
information as the public good generated by the patent system, other 
statements from the Court emphasize the practical benefits obtained by the 
public. Thus, for example, the Court in Brenner v. Manson maintained that 
 
143.  J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (quoting 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)). 
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“[t]he basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress 
for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an 
invention with substantial utility.”144 Brenner is widely understood as holding 
that a substantial utility is a necessary element of “invention” under the Patent 
Act.145 Under that formulation, the inducement standard should look to 
whether the possibility of a patent has induced not mere disclosure but useful 
public benefits. Such public benefits arise only if the invention leads not merely 
to earlier disclosure but also to earlier practical application. Acceleration of the 
disclosure of an invention ordinarily serves no social goal if the mere paper 
disclosure will not accelerate the actual arrival of an invention in the 
marketplace. The patent system should thus distinguish purely speculative 
patent applications from applications that are prophetic in the sense that they 
herald the arrival of important new technologies, but do so by meaningfully 
accelerating the arrival of those technologies. 
1. Speculative Patents 
This theoretical point is best illustrated by an example. Consider U.S. 
Patent 7,346,850, a “[s]ystem and method for iconic software environment 
management.”146 This patented software innovation generates a “graphical 
thumbnail” image of what a document would look like if it were to be opened 
in a particular program.147 The innovation is useful because it gives users a 
quick preview of the document’s appearance without the bother of launching 
the program. The innovation does, however, demand additional computing 
resources—such as memory and CPU cycles—to provide the preview, and the 
preview will not be helpful unless it is done quickly. In 1998, when the patent 
application was first filed, this innovation may have been impractical given the 
speed and memory capacity of most computers of the time. Later, as computers 
 
144.  383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966). 
145.  See, e.g., Janssen Pharmaceutica N.V. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. (In re ’318 Patent 
Infringement Litig.), 583 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (describing Brenner as requiring 
that “inventions must have ‘substantial utility’ and ‘specific benefit exist[ing] in currently 
available form’” and holding that even correct speculation is not a patentable invention); see 
also MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 3, at 228 (noting that, under the holding of Brenner, 
“establishing a utility is considered necessary to achieve an invention”); Michael J. Meurer, 
Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 684 n.34 (2009) (describing the 
utility doctrine articulated in Brenner as “relat[ing] to the question of whether the inventor 
has actually completed an invention”). 
146.  U.S. Patent No. 7,346,850, at [54] (filed June 12, 1998) (issued Mar. 18, 2008). 
147.  Id. at [57] (abstract). 
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improved, the feature became more practical, and the feature unsurprisingly 
has now been introduced commercially.148 
Let us assume that but for the inducement of a patent this preview 
innovation would not have been devised and disclosed until 2003 or so—a half 
decade after the 1998 filing date of the application, which is the patentee’s 
nominal “invention” date. Should the innovation be considered nonobvious? 
Not necessarily. If the practical implementation of the innovation has been 
advanced little by the inducement of the patent, then the social tradeoff is 
similar to what we graphically represented in Figures 7 and 8 in Section II.B. 
The disclosure of the invention occurs very early in time, but the actual arrival 
of the invention in practical terms changes little. Such patents might be called 
speculative patents, which do not disclose much nonobvious information 
helpful in realizing an invention but rather mere prognostications about future 
needs and capabilities. 
A more difficult case involves the controversial patents at issue in the 
Blackberry litigation.149 Those patents were generally directed to various 
elements of an “electronic mail system with RF communications to mobile 
processors.”150 Whether or not such a mail system was easy to imagine in 1991, 
any difficulty probably existed in part because many crucial elements of such a 
system were then in their infancy. Certainly, the inducement standard ought 
not discriminate against a patent merely because the inventor is so remarkable 
as to produce an invention years ahead of when it would otherwise be 
produced, provided that—and this is the crucial point—the earlier production 
of the information provides a substantial benefit to society by accelerating the 
arrival of the invention in practical terms.151 Yet if the technological 
contributions are sufficiently small in comparison to the total effort needed to 
generate a commercial product, then granting a patent may not accelerate the 
arrival of the invention and might even delay it. 
An alternative solution to the problem of speculative patents is for the law 
to impose a much more robust demonstration of practical utility as a 
prerequisite for obtaining a patent. For example, Michael Risch argues in a 
recent article that patents should not be granted unless the applicant 
 
148.  See, e.g., The Taskbar (Overview), MICROSOFT, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-
us/windows-vista/the-taskbar-overview (last visited Dec. 14, 2010) (describing the preview 
feature in Microsoft Windows 7). 
149.  NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (setting forth the 
family of related patents asserted against RIM’s Blackberry system). 
150.  U.S. Patent No. 5,436,960, at [54] (filed May 20, 1991) (issued Aug. 1, 1995). 
151.  Such an inventor already pays a price in a reduced patent term. See Duffy, supra note 110, at 
444. 
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demonstrates that, at the time of patent application filing, “there is a market 
for the invention,” and “the invention can be manufactured at a cost sufficient 
to fulfill market demand.”152 Risch makes clear that, under his proposal, many 
ideas would remain unpatentable until they were commercially realized. While 
such a heightened utility requirement has its attractions, it also has significant 
drawbacks. In particular, the heightened utility requirement would likely bar 
patents on pioneering research that has no immediate commercial application 
but that will substantially accelerate the time of ultimate commercialization. 
Current utility doctrine allows for patents on such inventions, provided that 
they can produce some “credible,”153 “specific[,] and substantial”—but not 
necessarily commercial—utility.154 The nonobviousness requirement then 
provides the more flexible means by which patents may be denied to paper 
inventions that seem to embrace more speculation than technical achievement. 
In sum, because society should gain some benefit if it is to tolerate the costs 
associated with granting a patent, the inducement standard focuses on the 
practical or commercialized invention, not merely a paper description of the 
invention. Three caveats are critical. First, the inducement standard does not 
insist that the patenteecommercialize the invention or even that the patentee 
find someone who will commercialize the invention. Some commentators have 
proposed “innovation patents,”155 which would insist that one commercialize 
an invention before receiving a patent on it, and some countries employ 
“working requirements,”156 under which patentees must engage at least in 
some minimal commercialization activity. These, however, can have perverse 
consequences, as patentees may inefficiently engage in commercialization 
simply to meet the legal requirement. In addition, it may be difficult to 
determine what constitutes sufficient activity.157 Under the economic approach, 
the patentee is rewarded for the technological accomplishment and is not 
 
152.  Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 
38), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1568063. 
153.  In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
154.  In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
155.  William Kingston, Innovation Patents and Warrants, in PATENTS IN PERSPECTIVE 68, 70 
(Jeremy Phillips ed., 1985); William Kingston, The “Thesis” Chapters, in DIRECT 
PROTECTION OF INNOVATION 1 (William Kingston ed., 1987). For a discussion, see Ted 
Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 398-400 (2010). 
156.  For a history, see Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of 
India’s Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 
593-97 (2007). The United States has long eschewed working requirements. See Cont’l 
Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908). 
157.  See Sichelman, supra note 155, at 397 (assessing incentives provided by working 
requirements). 
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required to commercialize it. The patentee might well commercialize the patent 
and use this as evidence of acceleration, but commercialization is not required, 
and such evidence in any event is not dispositive because the patentee might 
have commercialized the invention even without a patent.158 Meanwhile, 
commercialization by others who did not have the patent may be evidence 
against acceleration because this suggests that commercialization might have 
occurred even without the patentee’s development, but such evidence could 
count in the opposite direction where the commercializers appear to have 
copied the invention or lost a patent race. 
Second, the courts need not even be confident that the invention will in fact 
be commercialized. All that matters is whether, if the invention turns out to be 
worth commercializing, the patent likely did substantially accelerate 
commercialization. If commercialization never occurs, then the patent will be 
worthless and is not worth worrying about.159 What the inducement standard 
seeks to block is the granting of a patent when a technological contribution 
represents only a tiny portion of the total effort that would be required for 
commercialization and the patent incentive did not accelerate such 
commercialization.  
Third, the inducement standard nonetheless should not be seen as an 
inherent block to the granting of patents where a single commercialized 
product reflects many patents. The combination of many patents into a single 
product creates serious challenges for patent law and theory, and some 
commentators have worried that “patent thickets” may create an 
“anticommons” that will retard rather than advance innovation.160 Perhaps 
there are some areas of technology in which products encompass many patents 
and one can conclude that commercialization generally would occur at more or 
less the same pace even absent patent inducement. If so, the inducement theory 
would suggest that many such patents are invalid. But there may be other areas 
 
158.  See infra Subsection III.B.2.b. 
159.  There may still be some social costs to such patents, although the high cost of applying for a 
patent means that there would be little incentive to apply for patents on inventions almost 
certain not to be commercialized within the patent term. See Jonathan S. Masur, Costly 
Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS, Winter 2011, at 8 (noting that patents of 
“low private value and low (or negative) social value [may] increase the search costs and risk 
imposed on commercial firms”). 
160.  See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (discussing the anticommons 
problem in the patent context). But see Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Navigating the 
Anticommons for Pharmaceutical Patents: Steady the Course on Hatch-Waxman, (Univ. of Chi. 
Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 209, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=536322 (arguing that patent thickets are not a serious problem). 
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where many technologies are combined and where in fact the patent incentive 
is critical to development of all these technologies collectively. The inducement 
standard should apply to the group of patents as a whole, and patents should 
be granted. Holdouts and other familiar problems of patent licensing may 
ensue,161 but our goal in this Article is not to overcome them. 
What is particularly worrisome from our perspective is the case in which a 
patent contributes nothing other than prophecy or perhaps something that is 
relatively trivial but nonetheless the patent claims something critical to future 
invention. This situation is especially likely when a patent reads like an idea—
maybe it would be great to allow a user to view a miniature version of a 
document by moving one’s computer mouse over an icon, or to allow email by 
wireless phone—and simply describes some of the steps that any competent 
practitioner would quickly realize one would need to take to make the project 
work. The patent literature sometimes notes that the possibility of designing 
around a patent decreases a patentee’s ability to hold out for large undeserved 
sums,162 but speculative patents can cover fundamental (if simple) aspects of a 
technology such that they will be difficult to invent around. These patents are 
worrisome because they may in fact retard commercialization, as the patentee 
may credibly insist on a substantial portion of the rents from a new technology. 
Moreover, they may be a waste from a transaction costs perspective. The 
possibility of such valuable patents encourages prospective patentees to 
imagine technological capabilities that might exist in the future and describe 
how they might be used, whether or not such prophecy has beneficial 
economic consequences. 
2. Kitch’s Prospect Theory 
We are, of course, not the first patent theorists to focus on the significance 
of commercialization to the patent standard. Most famously, Edmund Kitch in 
1977 advanced a prospect theory of the patent system, arguing that the 
granting of a patent may be useful because the grant of the patent itself may 
 
161.  Possible remedies include antitrust law, see Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent 
Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151 (2009), and private ordering, see F. Scott 
Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, Engineering a Deal: Toward a Private Ordering Solution to the 
Anticommons Problem, 48 B.C. L. REV. 111 (2007). 
162.  See, e.g., Alan Devlin, Indeterminism and the Property-Patent Equation, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 61, 67 (2009) (noting that inventing around is one antidote to irrational holdouts). But 
see Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863, 874-75 
(2007) (noting that inventing around often may be impractical). 
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promote commercialization.163 A patent on a nascent technology, Kitch argues, 
can “increase[] the efficiency with which investment in innovation can be 
managed,”164 can give the patentee “an incentive to make investments to 
maximize the value of the patent without fear that the fruits of the investment 
will produce unpatentable information appropriable by competitors,”165 and 
can facilitate contracting.166 More recently, F. Scott Kieff has amplified Kitch’s 
analysis by focusing on how granting of a patent on new technology may tend 
to promote commercialization of that technology.167 For both Kitch and Kieff, 
then, patents can accelerate commercialization. 
It might seem that an inference based on the importance of 
commercialization is that patenting should wait until after commercialization 
so that there are incentives to take this step. Yet in fact, the literature on the 
prospect theory suggests the opposite, for two distinct reasons. First, an 
inventor who holds a patent may be more likely to commercialize than an 
inventor who hopes to have a chance of receiving a patent after 
commercialization.168 Second, when an inventor holds a patent before 
commercialization, there is likely to be less duplication in commercialization 
efforts.169 The ex post effects of this may be equivocal; sometimes duplication 
in commercialization is what we call “competition.”170 But, the ex ante effect of 
early patenting is that the invention is likely to be made earlier, when inventors 
anticipate that if patents are awarded relatively early, the amount that they 
might lose in a patent race is limited.171 If the race is not simply to create an 
invention but to create and then commercialize the invention, then the race will 
not be as attractive to enter because the expected costs of entry are higher. This 
argument suggests that the prospect approach of granting patents on nascent 
 
163.  Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). 
164.  Id. at 276. 
165.  Id. 
166.  Id. at 277-78. 
167.  F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. 
REV. 697 (2001). 
168.  Id. at 710. 
169.  See Duffy, supra note 110, at 444 (discussing “the prospect features of the patent system—
particularly the preference for the grant of patent rights early, before most of the resources 
have been committed to developing the technology and before much wasteful duplication 
can occur”). 
170.  See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 872 (1990). 
171.  Duffy, supra note 110, at 469-75. 
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technologies may be useful not solely for its ex post effects but also for its ex 
ante effects. 
The ex ante effect of accelerating invention, however, is not a social benefit 
if it does not also translate into acceleration of commercialization. A promise of 
a prospect patent surely leads to speculative patents being issued earlier than 
they otherwise would but to no useful end. Our analysis thus suggests a 
distinction between a speculative patent and a prophetic prospect patent that 
reflects a significant technological advance. Granting a prospect patent on an 
invention may be appropriate when commercialization efforts will follow 
thereafter, as then the promise of the patent accelerates invention and the 
resulting commercialization. Even if commercialization will not follow 
immediately, a prospect patent will be appropriate if, by some time after 
commercialization would be expected to occur, the invention would not have 
been created in the absence of the patent system. The inducement standard 
thus separates cases in which the ex ante prospect theory rationale supports 
patenting from those in which it does not. 
The more traditional ex post rationale for prospect theory, however, could 
be advanced against our approach and in favor of speculative patents. Under 
this theory, even if a speculative patent reflects no or minimal technological 
advance, the granting of a property right may accelerate commercialization. We 
should, the theory goes, grant speculative patents because it is useful to grant 
property rights to someone as a way of spurring additional discovery. The 
most straightforward approach is then to grant the property rights over a 
technological area to the first person who recognizes the future existence of 
that area. Moreover, a benefit of granting rights in this way is that potential 
patentees will compete to recognize future technological areas first. As a result, 
the patent will be awarded to the party who agrees to take the patent right for 
the shortest possible patent term.172 
We acknowledge potential benefits to such an approach but believe that the 
costs exceed the benefits.173 Once such a patent exists, the patent holder will 
have greater incentive to work on solving relevant technological and market 
problems because the initial patent increases the share of producer surplus that 
 
172.  However, even granting the proposition that patents will accelerate commercialization ex 
post, there is a disadvantage to this proposal. The usable portion of the patent term may end 
up being so small that there is little incentive to commercialize. See Michael Abramowicz, 
The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065 (2007) (providing an 
overview of this problem). 
173.  See Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races over Auctions, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
803 (2007). 
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the patent holder can expect to receive.174 But the incentive of other parties to 
work on the technological problems may be reduced if they believe that they 
will have to pay a tax to the first patent holder. This latter consideration may 
help explain the findings of those who have cast empirical doubt on the 
proposition that consolidating property rights tends to accelerate invention.175 
Although we cannot purport to resolve the problem conclusively, we suspect 
that granting property rights over a technological area to someone who has 
done nothing to accelerate development will likely reduce rather than increase 
overall investment in the technology.176 
This suggests that one should not grant a patent unless the inventor has 
solved a relatively significant percentage of the technological problems that 
need to be solved before commercialization can occur or unless others have 
already done so and the inventor has contributed one of the missing pieces. In 
these cases, the invention itself will generally—though not always—accelerate 
commercialization, and the ex post effects of granting a patent seem likely to 
accelerate invention as well. Once an inventor has worked out a large portion of 
a puzzle and possesses at least a blocking right against anyone else who might 
complete another piece of the puzzle,177 this inventor will have strong 
incentives considerably stronger than those of anyone else to complete the 
puzzle and commercialize it. By contrast, a speculative patent holder’s best 
strategy may be to do nothing, hope that others will do the hard work of 
invention and commercialization, and then sue for infringement. This is, of 
course, the story of a “patent troll,” a nonpracticing entity that has contributed 
little technology but hopes to use patenting as a source of profit.178 The 
inducement standard could thwart this strategy, while still preserving the 
ability of those who have made genuine technological contributions to be 
nonpracticing entities who license their technology to others. 
3. Merges’s Model of Nonobviousness 
Perhaps the most significant obstacle in the existing legal literature to our 
interpretation of the Graham inducement standard lies in a classic article on the 
 
174.  Duffy, supra note 110, at 483-91. 
175.  See Merges & Nelson, supra note 170, at 894-97. 
176.  See Abramowicz, supra note 173, at 845-47 (explaining how an auction design might 
stimulate additional research spending). 
177.  For discussions of blocking patents, see Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 
1364-66 (Fed. Cir. 2010); and Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining 
Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994). 
178.  See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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economics of the nonobviousness standard, written by Robert Merges.179 The 
article is an obstacle because Merges explicitly addresses the question that the 
literature has otherwise largely ignored—whether the degree to which an 
invention increases the probability of commercial success is relevant to the 
obviousness test—and concludes that it is not relevant. We will nonetheless 
argue that Merges’s broad argument in fact supports our position and then 
refute the specific argument that Merges makes against considering 
commercial success in the obviousness inquiry. 
Merges’s model shows that patent protection may augment the incentives 
of an individual inventor to undertake technological experiments and then to 
bring these experiments to market. For Merges, the nonobviousness 
requirement rewards inventions that reduce uncertainty about the probability 
of success.180 If initially a research path seems to have only a small probability 
of producing a successful technical result, but after some set of costly 
experiments a successful result is achieved, then the invention resulting from 
the research path is likely to count as nonobvious because the probability of 
success is now considerably higher. Merges recognizes that firms often will 
innovate without patent protection, for example because of first-mover 
advantages, but patent protection can increase incentives to take on low-
probability or high-cost projects. 
Merges’s approach is not a restatement of the inducement standard of 
patentability. Indeed, although he identifies the Graham approach as “[t]he 
conventional ideal standard of patentability,”181 he identifies an objection that 
would be powerful without our view of Graham as promoting inventions that 
accelerate technology, arguing that “very few patents would be granted today 
under this standard, since so few industries consider patents essential.”182 
Nonetheless, Merges’s approach is conceptually consistent with the Graham 
approach under our interpretation. His preferred standard “rewards one who 
successfully invents when the uncertainty facing her prior to the invention 
makes it more likely than not that the invention won’t succeed,”183 and he 
would measure uncertainty “from the perspective of the average skilled 
 
179.  Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1992). 
180.  Id. at 29-32. 
181.  Id. at 19. 
182.  Id. Even in some industries that do not consider patents essential, patents may accelerate 
invention and commercialization. 
183.  Id. (emphasis omitted). Merges’s model, however, does not establish the fifty percent 
success probability level as always the relevant threshold for judging nonobviousness. 
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inventor in the field.”184 When a research path appears unlikely to produce a 
successful invention, incentives to undertake that research path may be 
inefficiently low in the absence of patents. If the probability is sufficiently low, 
first-mover advantages may be inadequate and inventors will not undertake 
such research. Thus, the inventions that are induced by patent law will 
generally be those that ex ante appear to be low probability. Merges also 
recognizes that cost may be important.185 Although he would not make cost 
central to the patentability standard, he argues that the patentability threshold 
should be lower “for very high-cost research.”186 Our interpretation of the 
Graham test recognizes central roles for both uncertainty and cost because, in 
the absence of patent protection, either a low probability of success or a high 
cost of experimentation would generally significantly delay commercialization. 
Although we believe that the inducement standard, properly conceived, 
provides a better integrated explanation of, and justification for, the 
nonobviousness standard than do separate focuses on probability and cost, 
Merges’s model provides support for our approach. We agree that when an 
experiment has a high probability of succeeding and is relatively inexpensive, 
patent law is not needed to induce the resulting invention. Our chief 
improvement on Merges’s model is our focus on whether invention accelerates 
the date of commercialization, which makes his static model dynamic and 
embraces concerns about both probability and cost. Merges’s model 
nonetheless provides indirect support for this variation on the inducement 
standard. One justification for patentability, Merges notes, is that patents may 
increase not only the incentive to engage in technological experimentation but 
also the incentive to engage in development and commercialization of the 
results of experiments. It should be a small step from this recognition to our 
argument that the nonobviousness standard should be designed to exclude 
from patentability inventions that would not significantly accelerate 
commercialization. 
“The model,” he writes, “shows that patents may have a greater impact on 
incentives to develop than incentives to invent. Once a promising result is in 
hand, the heightened payoff from a patent more directly affects the expected 
value of developing the product.”187 Merges’s model thus shows that factoring 
 
184.  Id. at 20. 
185.  Merges cites the case of “a fairly certain experiment, leading to a product likely to succeed in 
the market, but involving very high experimentation costs and/or costs of commercial 
failure.” Id. at 32. 
186.  Id. at 4; see also id. at 43-55 (arguing that such a lower threshold would likely only affect risk-
averse firms that require an extra incentive to conduct risky research). 
187.  Id. at 33. 
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commercial uncertainty into the obviousness inquiry improves efficiency, 
moving the patent system closer to a hypothetically ideal system from the 
perspective of the Graham inducement standard. The patent system should be 
willing to count an invention as nonobvious when the invention and its 
development sufficiently lower uncertainty about the ultimate success of a 
research path, including consideration of commercial uncertainty. For Merges, 
in sum, “the key factor is the level of uncertainty facing the inventor just prior 
to the crucial experiment leading up to the patent.”188 
Perhaps surprisingly, then, Merges does not conclude that the probability 
of commercial success should affect the definition of nonobviousness. He asks: 
“Why focus on uncertainty at the initial experimental stage, when uncertainty 
at the second, or commercialization stage, can also drive expected returns 
below the break-even point, hence discouraging perhaps useful research?”189 
Merges offers “two primary reasons,”190 developed in just two brief 
paragraphs, as to why reduction in commercial uncertainty should not be 
relevant to a nonobviousness assessment. 
The first argument is that there is “intrinsic social value [in] producing 
information in the face of highly uncertain technical challenges.”191 In contrast, 
he claims that “information about what the market desires would seem to 
produce relatively few positive externalities.”192 Merges’s assertion, however, is 
irrelevant to the issue of whether nonobviousness should be judged by the 
extent to which an invention reduces commercial uncertainty. When 
technological experimentation reduces uncertainty, it will also have the effect 
of reducing commercial uncertainty. Thus, analysis of the degree to which an 
invention reduces commercial uncertainty is a measure of the technological 
achievement. Even if, contrary to our argument below, there is no social value 
to encouraging information about the marketplace, it may still be useful to 
measure technical achievement in commercial terms. Just as cost-benefit 
analysis seeks to use dollars as a common metric for aggregating a wide range 
of considerations, so too is reduction of commercial uncertainty a useful 
measure of technological achievement. 
 
188.  Id. 
189.  Id. at 34. 
190.  Id. 
191.  Id. 
192.  Id. For an argument that free rider problems may also prevent optimal production of 
information about what the market desires, see Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, 
Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 346-51 (2008). 
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Nominally in support of his first argument—but instead making an entirely 
separate argument—Merges states that “assess[ing] commercial or market 
uncertainty . . . would seem to be even more difficult than assessing technical 
uncertainty, as in the current patent system.”193 As will be revisited below, 
assessing commercial uncertainty, and in particular the degree to which an 
innovation has reduced such uncertainty, presents a timing challenge because 
patents are often awarded before commercialization. Nevertheless, if patent 
decisionmakers can assess in hindsight whether scientists would have believed 
that a particular approach would be successful, however, why should they not 
be able to assess in hindsight whether businesspeople would have thought that 
an approach would be successful? Just as a firm might be able to produce 
internal evidence that its scientists doubted that a particular approach would 
work (for example, because they initially tried some other approach), so too 
might a firm be able to produce evidence that potential funders were skeptical 
that the business could succeed. Indeed, there is a good reason that commercial 
success is sometimes called objective evidence of nonobviousness; and 
sometimes (though not all the time) it may be assessed more objectively than 
purely technological information by a court.194 
Finally, Merges argues that a promising experiment produces valuable 
information “even if it never leads to a viable commercial product.”195 One 
interpretation of this argument is that measuring the degree to which an 
invention is expected to accelerate commercialization is a poor measure of 
technological achievement and thus of the degree to which an invention should 
be thought of as nonobvious. We agree that many technically remarkable 
inventions never will in fact lead to viable commercial products because some 
other requirement for successful commercialization, such as consumer demand, 
will never materialize. Properly conceived, the inducement standard demands 
measuring not absolute value, but relative value in comparison to the 
experimentation needed for complementary technologies.196 We suspect that 
our approach would deny patentability to significant advances only when those 
advances are so abstract that it seems almost impossible that they could 
accelerate technology. Such advances might be unpatentable subject matter 
regardless.197 
 
193.  Merges, supra note 179, at 34. 
194.  See infra Subsection III.B.2. 
195.  Merges, supra note 179, at 34. 
196.  See infra text following note 251. 
197.  See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229-31 (2010) (confirming that abstract ideas are 
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)). 
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i i i .  administering the inducement standard 
Still confronting us is the task of moving from the Graham inducement 
standard to a functional doctrinal definition. This task reflects at least two 
challenges. The first challenge is that even if the inducement standard is the 
appropriate theoretical basis for distinguishing obvious from nonobvious 
inventions, decisionmakers might have trouble applying the test directly. It 
might even seem to invite dangerous inconsistency to ask decisionmakers to 
imagine a hypothetical world without patent incentives, in part because 
different people might have different opinions about the effect of patent 
protection on innovation. Even so, the Graham inducement standard can 
generate a structured approach that provides guidance on nonobviousness to 
decisionmakers as they develop legal standards. Moreover, the structured 
approach should be largely familiar. As the statute demands, we would begin 
by asking decisionmakers to consider what would be obvious to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art, though decisionmakers would be instructed 
that an entity could count as a person, and the question would be whether, 
absent patent incentives, this person would find it economically obvious to 
undertake the research necessary for success. 
The second challenge results from our argument that nonobviousness 
should depend on the extent to which a patent accelerates commercialization. 
Commercialization, we have argued, ought not be required in advance of 
patenting because such an extension of patent races would tend to postpone 
invention.198 Nevertheless, depending on the circumstances, commercialization 
might serve as evidence either in favor of or against inducement.199 It might 
appear, however, that even if evidence from market experiments is theoretically 
relevant, patent law simply cannot take that information into account because 
market experimentation generally occurs after a patent is granted. But we 
believe that common law rules can give extra credit in the validity 
determination to a patentee who has engaged in commercialization not likely to 
have occurred in the absence of receipt of a patent and can penalize a patentee 
when others who were not seeking patent protection commercialize the 
invention. The key is that courts often will be differently situated from 
examiners and may be able to take into account evidence not available when 
granting patents. Indeed, the courts have developed a series of objective indicia 
 
198.  See supra notes 155-157 and accompanying text. 
199.  It will militate in favor of inducement where the patentee promptly commercializes and no 
one else does, and against inducement where one or more other parties commercialize but 
the patentee does not. 
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of nonobviousness, which the Graham Court200 (perhaps regrettably) labeled 
“secondary considerations.”201 The secondary considerations as understood by 
courts today make more sense in light of the inducement theory, and an 
appreciation of the role of commercialization can further clarify and improve 
how the courts apply the secondary considerations. 
Thus, in addition to asking decisionmakers to consider the obviousness 
question from the perspective of the person having ordinary skill in the art, 
courts ideally should offer further guidance on the secondary considerations. 
Our analysis would continue to place considerable emphasis on many of the 
traditional secondary considerations of nonobviousness, such as a long-felt 
need for an invention and the failure of others. An additional consideration of 
nonobviousness that we would add to the inquiry is the cost of the 
experimentation leading to the invention. This is not dispositive, as the 
relevant factor is what the invention would have been expected to cost, but it is 
helpful evidence. Meanwhile, we would recast the most historically important 
of the secondary considerations, commercial success, so that the relevant 
question would be unexpected commercial success, which tends to show that a 
risky project would not have been undertaken without patent incentives. 
Finally, we would add several considerations of obviousness, guided by our 
analysis of the competitive dynamics of the patent system.202 For example, the 
fact that there was a positive demand shock shortly before the invention would 
tend toward obviousness, as would be a rapidly declining cost of invention. In 
total, this would provide considerable guidance to decisionmakers beyond 
what they receive now, without changing the overall structure of the 
obviousness inquiry. 
The approach that we suggest, though representing a shift in emphasis to 
which the courts would need to acclimate, would be more administrable than 
the current system. First, we avoid the inevitable confusion that results from 
doctrinal incoherence. As we have shown, at present courts nominally apply a 
cognitive approach to nonobviousness but then smuggle economic 
 
200.  Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). 
201.  The courts’ weight on secondary considerations is sufficiently great that the label 
“secondary” can be misleading. See Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal Circuit’s Patent 
Nonobviousness Standards: Theoretical Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal Changes, 85 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1051, 1068-76 (1991). These considerations may be even more important under recent 
case law. See Amanda Wieker, Secondary Considerations Should Be Given Increased Weight in 
Obviousness Inquiries Under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in the Post-KSR v. Teleflex World, 17 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 665 (2008). 
202.  See supra Section II.B. 
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considerations into the analysis.203 Second, the different parts of our test, the 
PHOSITA analysis and the secondary considerations, are more cohesive. 
Today, it sometimes seems that the two parts of the nonobviousness inquiry 
are almost unrelated,204 but we emphasize that each part is a tool for 
addressing the fundamental question of patent inducement. Third, our test 
provides more guidance than existing tests, because it highlights fundamental 
policy choices. Current decisionmakers receive essentially no guidance on how 
nonobvious an invention must be, but our insistence that decisionmakers 
consider whether technology is substantially accelerated provides structure to 
the inquiry. We do not say definitively what counts as “substantial,” but the 
duration of the patent term is a natural point of comparison, and we invite 
decisionmakers to compare the dynamic benefit of any estimated number of 
years of acceleration with the static costs of the patent term. Fourth, our 
approach better takes advantage of the natural comparative advantages of 
patent examiners and courts, and we identify situations where courts should be 
less deferential because relevant information would not have been available to 
examiners. 
A. Methodological Questions 
1. Heuristics Versus Direct Application 
Past commentators have embraced the inducement standard as a theoretical 
account of the purpose of the obviousness doctrine but have assumed that the 
standard would not be administrable.205 This observation makes sense on the 
assumption that decisionmakers would simply be told to apply the inducement 
standard in an open-ended fashion. The Supreme Court, in propounding the 
inducement standard, was not insisting that decisionmakers apply it directly in 
an unstructured way. Rather, the Court recognized the inducement standard 
was a useful description of what common law courts had been trying to achieve 
in developing the obviousness doctrine. Our call is for this evolutionary process 
to continue. Appellate judges developing frameworks for the obviousness test 
should see the inducement standard as a polestar, as should PTO officials 
developing guidelines for examiners. District judges or patent examiners could, 
 
203.  See supra Subsection I.A.2. 
204.  See, e.g., Endress + Hauser, Inc. v. Hawk Measurement Sys. Pty. Ltd., 892 F. Supp. 1107, 
1115-17 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (separating the two parts of the analysis into two unintegrated, 
separately numbered sections). 
205.  See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
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and ideally should, consider the inducement standard directly. Having a deeper 
theoretical understanding of the nonobviousness inquiry should tend to 
improve decisionmaking. Our goal, though, is to refine the existing 
administrative framework of the nonobviousness inquiry to nudge 
decisionmakers toward taking into account relevant concerns, even if they 
reflect little on first principles in day-to-day patent administration. Our 
approach emphasizes heuristics like the PHOSITA and secondary 
considerations of nonobviousness that should work tolerably well even when 
decisionmakers are unaware of the justifications for these heuristics. 
There are several reasons to prefer this approach over one that seeks to use 
the inducement standard as an unfiltered doctrinal test. First, we recognize the 
need for caution in attempts to solve the nonobviousness problem merely by 
conjuring up a perfect verbal explanation of what it means to be nonobvious. 
Switching from a cognitive approach to a more pragmatic one may help 
ground the inquiry, but any definition must ultimately be interpreted by a 
patent examiner or a judicial decisionmaker. The extent to which subtle 
distinctions in a definition actually affect legal decisionmakers is an empirical 
question.206 It is not clear how much of a difference instructing the 
decisionmaker to apply the inducement standard would make. Decisionmakers 
might well make serious errors. Even the best definitions may be somewhat 
prone to cognitive errors such as hindsight bias.207 But providing heuristics can 
lead to more consistent decisionmaking, even if the heuristics are an imperfect 
approximation of the underlying theoretical concept. 
Second, for some inventions it may be impractical for decisionmakers to try 
to identify the market conditions at the time of an invention in a way that 
would be helpful to apply our definition. In principle, the relevant inducement 
standard question is how long it would take for the market to have produced a 
particular invention absent patent incentives, but a decisionmaker may have 
little information about the market beyond the inventor. And yet another layer 
of complexity would result from trying to determine how firms might have 
acted differently in the absence of patent law. As a result, it is useful to have a 
 
206.  For a recent argument that administrative law doctrines have almost no effect on the 
outcomes of cases, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency 
Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77 (2011). 
207.  See Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight 
Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006) (discussing the problem 
of hindsight bias in the patent context). The inducement standard presents a problem of 
hindsight, as once the technology is developed, decisionmakers might imagine that one 
would not need the patent system to develop it. It might seem to add to this the challenge of 
foresight, as the decisionmakers must anticipate whether the invention would accelerate 
commercialization, at least in cases in which commercialization has not already occurred. 
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test that allows the decisionmakers at least initially to have a more limited 
focus, while also taking into account objective proxies for market conditions. 
We do not rule out the possibility that sometimes in high-end patent litigation, 
it might be appropriate for expert economists to testify directly on the 
inducement question. In the ordinary case and at least initially, however, 
decisionmakers must be able to focus on a relatively small number of easily 
digested pieces of information. 
Third, asking decisionmakers to apply the inducement standard directly 
would be a revolution. It is hard to see how such a revolution would take place. 
Even though the Supreme Court has embraced the standard, it seems unlikely 
that the Court could properly insist that decisionmakers consider the standard 
directly. If a jury must make a validity determination,208 for example, it would 
be awkward for the Supreme Court to invalidate jury instructions that included 
the text of § 103. What the Court can do by embracing the inducement 
standard is persuade lower courts that, if they do not give adequate attention to 
the inducement standard, then there is a risk that they will reach incorrect 
results that superior courts will reverse. Our goal is to show how some modest 
clarifications of principles that decisionmakers already apply can steer them in 
the right direction. The changes we recommend still might not seem modest to 
someone who is steeped in current practices, but we believe that these changes 
will be less tumultuous than the current path of maintaining nonobviousness 
as an essentially cognitive inquiry but injecting into the analysis considerations 
that are undoubtedly economic in nature. 
2. Courts Versus Agencies 
A significant debate in patent law concerns the relative importance of the 
PTO and of the courts in deciding questions of patent validity. On one side, 
Mark Lemley has argued that the PTO should be rationally ignorant. 
Recognizing that it has a relatively small amount of time in which to decide 
whether to issue a patent, the office might grant some patents despite some 
 
208.  Although patent validity in general, and obviousness in particular, are issues of law, see 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966), current Federal Circuit case law allows 
juries to render verdicts on obviousness questions, see, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 
868 F.2d 1226, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“It is established that the jury may decide the 
questions of anticipation and obviousness . . . .”). The Federal Circuit case law on this point 
conflicts with the decisions of other circuits rendered before the creation of the Federal 
Circuit. See, e.g., Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 688 F.2d 647, 651 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc) 
(holding that because obviousness is a question of law, jury verdicts on the issue must be 
considered advisory only and that “[t]he court must, in all cases, determine obviousness as a 
question of law independent of the jury’s conclusion”). 
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uncertainty about whether invalidating prior art might be found, leaving the 
courts a role to play in invalidating the patent.209 F. Scott Kieff has gone still 
further, arguing that the patent system should be replaced with a registration 
system.210 With appropriate fee-shifting rules,211 Kieff maintains that the courts 
should be trusted with complete responsibility for validity determinations. On 
the other side are those who insist that it is critical for investors to know 
whether a patent is valid before they back either the patent-protected product 
or one that might be accused of infringement.212 This view implies that the 
courts should almost always defer to PTO decisions. Existing law is somewhere 
between these extremes. The Federal Circuit grants a strong presumption of 
patent validity, even where the PTO never considered allegedly invalidating 
prior art,213 but it is still not uncommon for a court to find a patent invalid.214 
That courts sometimes disagree with the PTO’s nonobviousness 
determinations,215 and that the Federal Circuit often disagrees with the 
 
209.  See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001). 
210.  See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-
Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55 (2003). 
211.  Id. at 119-20 & n.278. 
212.  The Supreme Court, however, has sometimes adopted relatively vague and uncertain rules 
despite this concern. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 
722, 732 (2002) (“Each time the Court has considered the doctrine [of equivalents], it has 
acknowledged this uncertainty as the price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for 
innovation, and it has affirmed the doctrine over dissents that urged a more certain rule.”). 
213.  z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 507 F.3d 1340, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding, 
consistent with a long line of Federal Circuit precedents, that clear and convincing evidence 
is needed to invalidate a patent even where the PTO failed to consider the relevant art). We 
believe that this doctrine conflicts with basic principles of administrative law. Courts 
generally presume the actions of administrative agencies to be valid. See, e.g., Citizens To 
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971) (“Certainly, the Secretary’s 
decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity.”); Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 
86, 101 (1949) (“An administrative order is presumptively valid.”). But that presumed 
validity yields entirely “if the agency has . . . entirely failed to consider an important aspect 
of the problem.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
214.  See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases: An Empirical Peek Inside the Black 
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 380, 390 tbl.4 (2000) (reporting patents held invalid in thirty-
three percent of 1151 validity determinations in U.S. patent trials from 1983 to 1999). It may 
be dangerous to extrapolate too much from this statistic, as cases that are tried may be a 
nonrepresentative sample of all disputes. See Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, Toward a 
Taxonomy of Disputes: New Evidence Through the Prism of the Priest/Klein Model, 28 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 101 (1999) (offering empirical support for the proposition that plaintiff win rates will 
be a function of structural parameters, such as the parties’ uncertainty, given the existence of 
settlement before trial). 
215.  See, e.g., Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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determinations of lower federal courts, reinforces the view that the existing 
obviousness test allows for a great deal of disagreement. 
Regardless of whether the economic approach increases or decreases the 
predictability of the obviousness test, it might appear likely to increase the 
divide between the PTO and the courts. We have argued that 
commercialization activity, both by the patentee and by other parties, may be 
relevant to the inducement standard. Patent applications are generally filed 
before commercialization, however, and the patent PTO then must make a 
decision whether to award a patent before commercialization evidence fully 
develops. The courts, meanwhile, should generally be in a better position to 
analyze commercialization, both because adjudication will generally take place 
years after a patent is issued216 and because judges may have more time to 
consider this evidence than harried examiners generally do. Application of the 
inducement standard, one might worry, will create two laws of 
nonobviousness, one in the administrative agency and one in the courts. 
This need not, however, be cause for concern. There are good reasons for 
the PTO and the courts to share the task of determining patent validity, and 
conventional wisdom holds that it makes sense to have an early determination 
of nonobviousness by the agency and a later, more thorough review by the 
courts.217 This conventional wisdom makes even more sense once the 
obviousness test is viewed in economic rather than purely cognitive terms. If, 
after all, the only question is whether a hypothetical person at a hypothetical 
time would understand that a particular technological solution exists for some 
problem, then it might seem strange to delay decisionmaking, aggravating 
concerns about hindsight bias.218 If all the prior art is presented to an examiner, 
the additional time that courts have to consider evidence might seem to have 
little relevance. When obviousness is conceived in purely cognitive terms, the 
question is whether one who knows the prior art will easily conceptualize the 
invention, and it might seem that a quick reaction to that question best allows 
the decisionmaker to simulate the mindset of the inventor.219 If the inducement 
 
216.  See, e.g., SAMSON VERMONT, LITIGATION RISK ANALYSIS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND 
LITIGATION, Part IV, http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details/FileUpload265/388/ 
Risk_Reward_4.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2011) (stating that for the average litigated patent, 
final judgment is not rendered until 12.3 years after the patent application was filed). 
217.  See Lemley, supra note 209, at 1510 (arguing that, at the margin, spending more money on 
litigation makes more sense than spending more money on improved patent searches). 
218.  See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
219.  Cf. MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK (2005) (arguing that instantaneous decisions are sometimes 
better than reasoned ones). But see Richard A. Posner, Blinkered, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 24, 
  
the yale law journal  120: 159 0  2 011  
1662 
 
standard suggests that an economic approach is more appropriate than a 
cognitive one, and if the economic approach requires more analysis, we should 
be willing to accept a greater discrepancy in roles for the agency and the courts. 
We doubt, however, that explicit adoption of an economic approach would 
increase the discrepancy significantly. The courts, after all, have already 
incorporated economic considerations into the process of evaluating patent 
validity. One vehicle through which they do this is the secondary 
considerations of nonobviousness, and in particular the consideration that is 
most frequently asserted in litigation, commercial success.220 Although PTO 
procedure allows examiners to take into account commercial success,221 timing 
problems may often prevent patent applicants from reporting it. A discrepancy 
thus already exists, and as long as the heuristics that we recommend hew 
reasonably closely to the existing secondary considerations, agency and judicial 
decisions should be no more discrepant than previously. Indeed, the adoption 
of a cohesive obviousness test may present an opportunity to make agency and 
judicial decisions less discrepant, even if timing issues prevent the agency from 
taking some of the secondary considerations into account. Adoption of the 
economic approach allows all of the secondary considerations to be conceived 
in terms of the inducement standard, and so as long as the agency can take into 
account some of the secondary considerations the agency and the courts may be 
more likely to agree. Agency-court disagreement may be greater when the 
agency conceives of nonobviousness in cognitive terms while the courts alone 
add into the mix a number of primarily economic factors. 
B. A Structured Economic Inquiry 
The existing framework for applying the obviousness doctrine can, with 
minor extensions and adjustments, accommodate the inducement standard’s 
insights. An economic approach retains the statute’s focus on the person 
having ordinary skill in the art but considers not simply what this person 
would think about technology but also the economic incentives that this person 
faces. Subsection III.B.1 elaborates on this inquiry, and Subsection III.B.2 
explains how the secondary considerations of nonobviousness can reinforce the 
economic approach. 
 
2005, at 27, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/blinkered (critiquing Gladwell’s 
argument). 
220.  See infra Subsection III.B.2.b. 
221.  See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE  
§ 716.03 (8th ed. 6th rev. Sept. 2007), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/ 
mpep/mpep.htm. 
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1. Obviousness of the Invention to a PHOSITA 
Ideally, the PHOSITA obviousness test222 should reflect a central insight of 
the inducement standard: that whether an invention is obvious depends on 
how costly an experiment would be and the probability that the experiment 
would be successful. The obviousness test should generally protect inventions 
that are expensive to generate, either because an experiment that might 
produce the invention is itself expensive or because it is unlikely to lead to the 
invention. Fortunately, the PHOSITA obviousness test can accommodate these 
insights as long as the test no longer isolates the PHOSITA’s state of mind 
regarding technology from economic considerations. The required addition to 
the test would be that an invention should be considered obvious when a 
PHOSITA would have considered it obvious that it would be worth trying the 
experiments needed to obtain the invention in question, even if it would be 
impossible to obtain a patent on the results or keep them a trade secret.223 This 
approach is consistent with the “easily discovered” definition of obvious and 
simply turns the PHOSITA into a person (or an entity)224 with economic 
common sense as well as technological knowledge. 
This approach embraces the inducement standard by insisting that the 
decisionmaker consider what the PHOSITA would have done absent patent 
incentives or the protection of trade secrecy. As such, we are vulnerable to some 
of the concerns that we had about simply instructing decisionmakers to apply 
the inducement standard, though we think that these concerns are not as 
severe. This instruction would keep the court’s focus on the PHOSITA, while 
ideally noting that an entity can be a “person.” An expert might well testify 
about what such a person thought about economic feasibility, for example by 
noting the investments in machines and personnel that would have been 
necessary to accomplish an experiment. But we would not need a phalanx of 
market experts expounding on market structure and projections. If this 
principle were clarified in common law, it could easily be absorbed into 
practice without worrying about how decisionmakers would interpret an 
entirely new framework. 
 
222.  See supra Subsection I.A.1. 
223.  Note that the question is not whether the PHOSITA would have tried the experiment 
personally. It might be that any individual PHOSITA would conclude that the experiment is 
so obvious that some other PHOSITA would likely do it. The question is whether it would 
be worth the effort of some PHOSITA, even if imperfect information leaves some slim 
possibility that no one will actually do the experiment on the assumption that others are 
doing it. 
224.  See supra Section I.A. 
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The law can nudge decisionmakers to consider inducement by turning the 
PHOSITA into someone with ordinary sensitivity to the economic realities of 
innovation without patents. This approach avoids turning the PHOSITA into 
an economic superman or superwoman, one who understands all economic 
models or has perfect economic foresight. The PHOSITA instead becomes 
closer to the reasonable person of tort law. In practice, tort decisionmakers do 
not ordinarily perform detailed cost-benefit analyses to realize the Hand 
formula,225 and there is similarly no reason to worry that giving the PHOSITA 
some economic common sense will open the floodgates so that sophisticated 
economic models will be needed to make everyday patent decisions. We would 
not necessarily prohibit such modeling; perhaps in the rare case such modeling 
might be helpful. But the experience of tort law at least suggests that just 
because a hypothetical reasonable person takes into account economic 
considerations does not mean that the legal regime must be interpreted in a 
way that provides full employment for economists. 
Our PHOSITA is of course a hypothetical entity, as an objective standard 
necessarily requires. But we do not think it is any more hypothetical than the 
PHOSITA of present patent law, and indeed we suspect that our changes 
might allow emergence of a PHOSITA that is somewhat less hypothetical than 
the present one. The present PHOSITA, we have noted, is assumed to have a 
perfect knowledge of all prior art but ordinary creativity in assembling 
disparate pieces of this art.226 Our move away from a cognitive test suggests 
less emphasis on what the PHOSITA knows and more emphasis on what the 
PHOSITA can discover and on how much such discovery would cost. An 
implication is that more emphasis should be placed on a well-known piece of 
prior art than on one that is in a journal obscure even to experts in the relevant 
fields. Similarly, more emphasis should be placed on a piece of prior art that 
can be easily found with Internet searches than on one that, rather than use 
common words in a field, invents its own lexicon in such a way as to hide the 
invention from all but the most determined searcher. 227 All prior art would, of 
course, remain relevant to the novelty inquiry,228 but the inquiry into 
obviousness would more closely track the experience of real scientists who 
 
225.  See Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1020 (1994) (noting 
that it is puzzling that jury instructions do not generally reference the Hand Formula 
directly). 
226.  See supra Subsection I.A.1. 
227.  See CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting 
that patentees can define terms as they choose). 
228.  35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (setting forth the novelty requirement). 
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attempt to discern the prior art as a step to solving a technical problem.229 This 
refinement of the PHOSITA test is independent of our primary suggestions, as 
one could conceive of an omniscient PHOSITA who also takes into account 
economic concerns, but the possibility helps show that our approach need not 
make the PHOSITA test more hypothetical and less administrable, and indeed 
it might well have the reverse effect. 
A counterargument is that the PHOSITA test is settled doctrine and any 
major change in the conception of the PHOSITA will be unsettling. We agree, 
but it does not appear that patent doctrine can continue merrily along in any 
event given developments in the Supreme Court. In particular, the courts must 
flesh out the KSR decision’s recognition that an invention could be obvious 
because it is obvious to try.230 The Federal Circuit has already moved in this 
direction, sensibly recognizing the relevance of factors such as the cost of 
experimentation.231 But the result of these case law developments is doctrinal 
disjointedness that will persist as long as the courts combine a cognitive 
definition of nonobviousness combined with ad hoc doctrines importing 
economic considerations. 
Consider the following example: even in the absence of a patent system, 
there would be AIDS researchers, working both for philanthropic causes and 
for companies that might hope to achieve some commercial benefit by being 
the first to introduce such a vaccine (for example, because of the benefits of 
trademark protection).232 If it became obvious to such researchers, for example 
because of some scientific discovery, that it would be worth trying to perform 
the set of research steps, even without a patent incentive, then any resulting 
vaccine should count as obvious. But if it would not be obviously worthwhile 
for these scientists to devote their scarce research funds to a research path that 
would have led to the invention, then the resulting invention should count as 
nonobvious. The PHOSITA concept thus implicitly takes into account 
expected cost and expected probability of success. An inventor who develops a 
 
229.  In many industries, such scientists themselves may appear hypothetical, as lawyers 
commonly advise scientists not to consider issued patents for fear that they might expose 
themselves to willful infringement liability. See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending 
Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1100-02 (2003) (explaining how 
willful infringement doctrine interferes with patent law’s disclosure function). 
230.  See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); supra text accompanying note 52. 
231.  See In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009); supra text accompanying notes 69-70. 
232.  The standard, of course, is objective, so philanthropic inventors should be as eligible for 
patents as anyone else. Even inventors who seek to promote the public domain sometimes 
may seek patents. See, e.g., Grant Gross, Red Hat: Our Software Patents Are Defensive, and 
We’ll Share, LINUX.COM (May 29, 2002), http://www.linux.com/archive/articles/23154 
(explaining Red Hat’s decision to seek software patents).  
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theory to try a research path that others would not have considered should be 
able to obtain a patent, whether this is because the research path would have 
been seen as too expensive, too unlikely to produce a positive outcome, or 
simply because the research path was so clever that individuals without a 
patent incentive would not likely have conceived of it. A proper understanding 
of the “obvious to try” concept flows naturally from our approach. 
A virtue of this approach is that it takes into account the cost of the time of 
the person having ordinary skill in the art. One problem with the PHOSITA 
approach as generally conceived is that, even once we take into account the 
potential cost of executing the experiment, it might seem that the cost of the 
PHOSITA is not directly relevant. The test asks whether the invention would 
have been obvious to someone with ordinary skill in the art, not what the 
person charges or how many hours (or how many such people) achieving the 
result would require. Case law sometimes sets a somewhat arbitrary level for 
the education level or experience of the PHOSITA,233 without considering 
whether someone at that threshold would have sufficient incentives to innovate 
in the absence of patent protection. Worse, ordinary skill is likely to be set 
higher in fields where patent incentives have induced the hiring of highly 
skilled and expensive researchers,234 thus ratcheting up the patentability 
standard for fields that are inherently difficult to practice, even where no one 
would be practicing absent patent incentives. Our approach does not do this. 
Whether an experiment is worth the time of a PHOSITA depends implicitly on 
the alternative uses of a PHOSITA’s time. If a PHOSITA would have thought 
it better to work on other matters without the patent or trade secret incentive 
for a particular invention, that is enough for patentability. 
Our approach to the PHOSITA test also conveys the appropriate baseline, a 
world in which the inventor makes decisions to invent but for reasons other 
than patent and trade secrecy. The inducement standard asks whether there 
would have existed alternative incentives (such as first-mover advantages and 
copyright law) for the invention. But we do not expect decisionmakers to read 
the business literature on first-mover advantages235 or to acquaint themselves 
 
233.  See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 138, 155 (D. Mass. 2000) (specifying that 
the PHOSITA “would have worked as a loudspeaker designer for two to three years”). 
234.  See Joseph P. Meara, Just Who Is the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law’s 
Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH. L. REV. 267, 280-81 (2002) (noting that the education level 
required will be higher for “those involved in drug discovery” than those involved “in the art 
of fly wraps for the legs of horses”). 
235.  See, e.g., Roger A. Kerin, P. Rajan Varadarajan & Robert A. Peterson, First-Mover Advantage: 
A Synthesis, Conceptual Framework, and Research Propositions, J. MARKETING, Oct. 1992, at 33, 
34-39 (1992) (providing overview of literature); Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. 
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with more modern versions of Stephen Breyer’s calculations about copyright 
incentives.236 We suspect, for example, that decisionmakers would be more 
wary of a software invention if presented with testimony indicating that either 
the patentee or its rivals intended to produce the product embodying some 
process in any event—in other words, that patenting was a secondary 
consideration. We also suspect that decisionmakers could be made to 
understand that pharmaceutical research is so expensive and so easily copied 
that nonpatent incentives to conduct it are ordinarily quite limited. 
We do not mean to imply that the construct of a hypothetical person with 
economic common sense is perfect. There may be situations in which it could 
lead the decisionmaker astray, though it should be possible for common law 
decisionmaking and instructions to decisionmakers to limit this danger. Take, 
for example, the situation in which only the top experts in a field would 
recognize the wisdom of a particular approach, but they would do so even 
absent any inducement of patents. If, for example, some development in 
topology would have led a number of Nobel Prize-winning physicists to 
conceive of a particular invention even without patent protection, then those 
Prize winners ought to set the level of ordinary skill. This type of situation will 
not emerge often, but imagining it emphasizes that, in theory, the level of skill 
in the art may depend on the importance of the problem to be solved. This is 
the case particularly for inventions that are the result of intellectual 
contemplation. Highly trained scientists are likely to offer at least some analysis 
on extraordinarily important problems even without patent protection. If such 
scientists surely would have made a particular intellectual contribution without 
the inducement of patents, then the only relevant question should be whether 
it would be obvious to try any necessary follow-up experimentation in the 
absence of the patent system. An economic approach should thus permit the 
PHOSITA to be defined at a very high level of skill, even in some 
circumstances where the monetary incentives for invention are low. 
In addition to constructing the PHOSITA as a person having ordinary 
economic sense, we also would make three subtle refinements that clarify the 
appropriate obviousness inquiry under the statute. First, as previously 
mentioned, we would construe “ordinary” skill to mean the level of skill that 
would exist without patent inducements. Currently, in litigation, the level of 
ordinary skill receives relatively little attention, with the parties often simply 
 
Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, STRATEGIC MGMT. J., Summer 1998, at 41, 42-47 
(same). 
236.  See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, 
and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 294-95 (1970) (estimating costs for a first 
publisher and a copier). 
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stipulating that the relevant skill level is that of a Ph.D. researcher in the 
relevant field.237 That approach invites courts to treat ordinary as meaning 
average, which is incorrect and produces strange policy results. If the possibility 
of patents induces an industry to make more investments in research by hiring 
smarter and better-educated researchers, the law should reward the industry’s 
investment with more patents, not punish it with an excessively stringent 
nonobviousness standard. 
A second refinement is that the “art” relevant to the inquiry must hone in 
on the invention’s exact contribution, or set of contributions, with the scope of 
the art resolved by reference to the economic incentives in the field. For 
example, if a software patent involves a complex structure for organizing 
interactions among different code modules, the relevant art may seem to be 
software architecture rather than merely software programming. But the 
decisionmaker should ask the further question whether specialists in software 
architecture would exist absent patent protection. If such specialists would not 
exist, then the PHOSITA may be much more of a generalist, with less ability to 
modify computer architecture. Also advances in some fields may typically 
depend on the collaborative efforts of several specialists. For example, the 
design of new surgical tools may require collaboration between surgeons and 
metallurgists. As a group, the collaborative entity might have a high degree of 
skill in both surgery and metallurgy, but the decisionmaker should ask 
whether, in the absence of patents, such collaborations would exist. If not, the 
PHOSITA may be a person with skill in the art of either surgery or metallurgy, 
but not both.  
A third and final refinement demands rigorous attention to the scope of the 
“invention” at issue, with the overarching goal being to discourage speculative 
patents of the sort discussed above.238 Suppose, for example, that a 2011 patent 
application claims software for determining the order in which clothes 
removed from a dryer should be folded, taking into account factors such as the 
susceptibility of the fabric to wrinkles and the location of each item of clothing 
in the pile. In theory, such software could be used today to advise people doing 
laundry about the order in which to fold their clothes, but there would be 
 
237.  See, e.g., Herbert F. Schwartz, KSR v. Teleflex: The Nonobviousness Requirement of 
Patentability, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 875, 909 (2007) (stating that 
sometimes “people just punt on it and they stipulate that the person of ordinary skill in the 
art has a Ph.D. in nuclear engineering, and then people go on to something else”). There are 
cases, however, in which the issue is litigated. See Meara, supra note 234 (providing an 
overview of doctrine and criticizing the tests as not well connected to the concerns of the 
obviousness doctrine). 
238.  See supra Section II.C. 
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almost no market for the software because people can readily make such 
decisions on their own. It is possible, though, that in a few years, robots will be 
able to fold laundry,239 and of course, the robots would need good software. 
How should the nonobviousness of the clothes-folding software be evaluated?  
We believe that the inducement standard provides relatively clear guidance 
on the question: in evaluating the nonobviousness of the clothes-folding 
software, the inventor should receive neither a bonus nor penalty because an 
important complementary technology to the invention does not exist. Thus, 
the decisionmaker should not fall into the trap of thinking that, because it is 
highly uncertain and speculative that laundry-folding robots will ever be 
commercialized, software for such robots must be especially nonobvious. The 
invention is the software, not the robots, so the inventor’s task of proving 
obviousness should not be made easier merely because uncertainties associated 
with complementary technologies make ultimate commercial success remote. 
We believe that the decisionmaker can avoid this trap through a simple 
heuristic: the decisionmaker should assume that all complementary 
technologies (such the robots) do exist and then determine whether, with 
those complementary technologies in existence, it would be obvious for a 
PHOSITA even without patent incentives to develop the claimed invention. 
The answer may depend on the sophistication of the invention. Given the 
technology to fold laundry robotically, a PHOSITA undoubtedly would need 
some software for determining the order to fold it. The invention should thus 
receive a patent covering only claims that represent an accomplishment beyond 
what the PHOSITA would do without a patent incentive. Our approach would 
thus reject speculative patents—for example, to the patent applicant who has 
not done little more than recognize that if robots are ever developed to fold 
clothes, they will need software to know to be extra careful with linen—while 
recognizing the possibility that genuine technological accomplishments often 
occur in advance of commercial application. 
2. Secondary Considerations 
Although the construct of the PHOSITA is mentioned in § 103 itself and is 
thus well established in the law, the broader case law on nonobviousness is 
today in a somewhat uncertain state. The Federal Circuit formerly followed the 
so-called teaching-suggestion-motivation test, finding that one of these was 
 
239.  See RLLberkeley, (50X) Autonomously Folding a Pile of 5 Previously-Unseen Towels, YOUTUBE 
(Mar. 17, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gy5g33S0Gzo (demonstrating a 
primitive prototype). 
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required to make an invention nonobvious.240 In KSR v. Teleflex,241 the 
Supreme Court rejected the teaching-suggestion-motivation test, seemingly 
adopting a more flexible test of nonobviousness. KSR creates an interpretive 
vacuum. Perhaps in future cases, the Supreme Court or the Federal Circuit 
could seize upon the inducement standard of Graham to clarify case law. In 
addition to potentially leading to the changes in the conception of PHOSITA 
that we suggest above, the Court also could focus on refining the analysis of 
the secondary considerations of nonobviousness. 
a. Considerations of Nonobviousness 
Graham itself first coined the term “secondary considerations,” and 
recognized the legitimacy of using these factors in deciding obviousness.242 
Secondary considerations are therefore a natural doctrinal path for further 
development of the nonobviousness standard. Moreover, the Federal Circuit 
has placed considerable emphasis on the secondary considerations, and so 
increased focus on or clarification of these considerations need not be a great 
divergence from the status quo. The factor most commonly raised in litigation, 
and often most controversial in academic commentary, is whether the 
invention has produced commercial success.243 Another factor, which one 
commentator describes as “the most prevalent form of evidence of 
nonobviousness relied on by patent applicants during patent examination,”244 
is whether the experiment producing the invention has produced “unexpected 
 
240.  See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing the 
test). The inducement standard will lead to the same results as the old test in many cases. 
Where there is a teaching, suggestion, or motivation indicating that a particular approach is 
likely to produce success, often there will be enough incentive for someone to follow 
through on this teaching, suggestion, or motivation, even without patent protection. But the 
inducement standard shows that this will lead to both false negatives and false positives. 
Sometimes, even without a teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art, and even 
without a patent incentive, an invention might have been developed early enough to allow 
commercialization on close to the same timetable. On the other hand, a teaching, 
suggestion, or motivation might be so uncertain or expensive to pursue with further 
research that such research would not have occurred without a patent incentive. 
241.  550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
242.  Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). 
243.  See, e.g., In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 996 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (discussing the relevance of 
commercial success). 
244.  Harris A. Pitlick, Some Thoughts About Unexpected Results Jurisprudence, 86 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 169, 169 (2004). 
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results.”245 Other factors include whether others tried but failed to create the 
invention or solve the same problem,246 whether there was a long-felt need for 
the invention,247 whether competitors have agreed to license the invention,248 
whether others skilled in the art have approved of the invention,249 and 
whether infringers have copied the invention.250 Some of these factors, such as 
failure of others and long-felt need, could be easily considered by examiners as 
well as by courts, while others, such as licensing and copying, may be 
ascertainable only in litigation. Commentators have proposed additional 
secondary considerations, such as whether the invention has provided the 
inventor with market power.251 
The inducement standard approach supports these secondary 
considerations in general, while also suggesting caveats. Inventions, we have 
seen, will generally be patent-induced when the experiments leading to them 
are expected to have a low probability of success and/or to bear a high cost 
relative to the rents to be earned from invention. The decisionmaker 
considering the PHOSITA can directly consider the difference between the 
claimed subject matter and the prior art, and the secondary considerations can 
assist the decisionmaker by identifying objective signs of low probability, high 
cost experimentation. The secondary considerations should reflect an 
understanding of the economics of patent races so that the decisionmaker need 
not necessarily understand directly the details of such a model.  
The secondary considerations are largely successful in directing 
decisionmakers to the correct inquiries. The focus on unexpected results, for 
example, is consistent with the point that low probability experimentation 
 
245.  See, e.g., Takeda Chem. Indus. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (“[A]ny prima facie case of obviousness was rebutted by the unexpected results of 
[the product’s] non-toxicity.”). 
246.  See, e.g., Knoll Pharm. Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 367 F.3d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(holding that the district court erred by failing to consider “evidence of the failure of others 
to develop [the product]”). 
247.  See, e.g., Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding 
evidence of a long-felt need). 
248.  See, e.g., WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(quoting the lower court’s opinion that such licenses are “strong indicia that the patent is 
not obvious”). 
249.  See, e.g., In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
250.  See, e.g., Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(“Another indicia of non-obviousness is . . . the copying that occurs [after a product is 
released].”). 
251.  See Andrew Blair-Stanek, Increased Market Power as a New Secondary Consideration in Patent 
Law, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 707 (2009). 
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should generally be rewarded, though it does not directly take into account 
cost. The fact that others have tried and failed supports the notion that success 
was uncertain, though it does not consider whether success would have 
remained uncertain between the time of invention and commercialization. The 
consideration of long-felt need for the invention, however, helps compensate 
for this deficiency, because if such a need long existed there is a good chance 
that the invention would be ready for commercialization. The approval of 
others points to the expected difficulty of the task; others having ordinary skill 
in the art would likely not admire efforts that, even in the absence of patent 
incentives, they themselves might well have taken. Licensing and copying 
sometimes may be an indication that independent invention would be difficult, 
but because decisions of others reflect their view of patent law we must ensure 
that we do not place so much weight on this consideration as to make 
obviousness doctrine circular. 
A decisionmaker animated by the inducement standard ideally should not 
simply assign some weight to each of the secondary considerations. Rather, the 
various secondary considerations are useful clues in helping the decisionmaker 
apply the inducement standard. They should be seen as probative and 
understood as interdependent. For example, even if the inventor has not had 
any commercial success, evidence that others have copied the invention and 
had commercial success might help the inventor establish that other factors 
necessary to commercialization were present and yet that competitors could not 
figure out how to proceed on their own. Evidence of commercialization by 
others would point in the opposite direction if it seemed that the others had 
developed the invention independently, another secondary consideration. 
A textual counterargument to this interpretation of the secondary 
considerations might insist that any proxy for the cost of experimentation 
should be irrelevant. The last sentence of § 103(a) states: “Patentability shall 
not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.”252 Some 
commentators see this sentence as indicating that the courts must consider 
only the end product of invention, not the process by which the invention was 
produced.253 As others have noted,254 however, and as the official legislative 
 
252.  35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
253.  See, e.g., Varu Chilakamarri, Structural Nonobviousness: How Inventiveness Is Lost in the 
Discovery, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, 11-12 (2005). 
254.  See, e.g., George M. Sirilla, 35 U.S.C. § 103: From Hotchkiss to Hand to Rich, The Obvious 
Patent Law Hall-of-Famers, 32 MARSHALL L. REV. 437, 511-12 (1999) (recounting Judge Rich’s 
recollection as the principal drafter of the Patent Act). 
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history prominently confirms,255 the sentence was a reaction to case law 
indicating that patentability must reflect a “flash of genius,”256 and it makes 
clear that inventions resulting from detailed experimentation were also entitled 
to patentability. The inducement standard, meanwhile, would not prevent 
patentability of inventions reflecting a flash of genius, as long as the expected 
cost of invention was high. Section 103 does not state that evidence of the 
manner of invention cannot be considered; its passive wording indicates that 
the manner of invention may be relevant but cannot alone be sufficient to 
determine patentability. The fact that the inducement standard is objective257 
helps make sense of this puzzle. It does not matter how the inventor arrived at 
the invention, but the expected difficulty of producing the invention is central 
to the obviousness doctrine. 
This analysis at least counters the argument that a factor such as long-felt 
need should not be relevant because long-felt need is a proxy for the cost of 
experimentation and the statute deems the cost of experimentation irrelevant. 
Properly understood, long-felt need is a proxy for the expected cost of 
experimentation. This understanding also suggests that the actual cost of 
experimentation should join the pantheon of secondary considerations. Quite 
possibly, the last sentence of § 103 explains why courts have not adopted cost 
as a secondary consideration. Once the inducement standard places the 
secondary considerations into economic context and clarifies the relevant factor 
of experimentation’s expected, rather than actual, cost, it should be possible to 
consider the actual cost of experimentation as a proxy for expected cost. There 
is some danger that because of hindsight bias decisionmakers might place too 
much weight on this consideration and refuse patentability for experiments 
that turned out to be low cost or grant patentability because of unnecessary 
high costs. But a very high actual cost of experimentation should at least be 
allowed as evidence, although not necessarily dispositive, of nonobviousness. 
b. Considerations of Commercial Success 
But what of the frequently raised, and most controversial, of the secondary 
considerations: commercial success? Before he advocated the prospect theory 
 
255.  “The second sentence states that patentability as to this requirement is not to be negatived 
by the manner in which the invention was made, that is, it is immaterial whether it resulted 
from long toil and experimentation or from a flash of genius.” Graham v. John Deere Co., 
383 U.S. 1, 16 n.8 (1966) (discussing 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 annot. 1952 (West 2004)). 
256.  Hamilton Standard Propeller Co. v. Fay-Egan Mfg. Co., 101 F.2d 614, 617 (6th Cir. 1939) 
(“The patentee did not display any flash of genius, inspiration or imagination . . . .”). 
257.  See supra Subsection I.D.1. 
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of the patent system,258 Edmund Kitch was skeptical of the use of commercial 
success evidence.259 One basis for his skepticism is that only patents on 
commercially successful products will be litigated.260 Later, Kitch defended the 
commercial success criterion based on the development of his prospect theory, 
noting that “[t]he fact that a product or process within the terms of the patent 
claim is commercially successful tells the court that the patent serves as the 
foundation for a series of now valuable contract rights.”261 This argument, 
however, cannot easily justify the use of commercial success to determine 
nonobviousness, because obvious inventions, if sufficiently valuable, can also 
serve as a foundation for contract rights. 
In his earlier work, Kitch offers a persuasive argument that commercial 
success will not necessarily be a strong indication of nonobviousness, arguing 
that the chain of inferences from commercial success back to nonobviousness is 
long and weak: 
First, that the commercial success is due to the innovation. Second, that 
. . . potential commercial success was perceived before its development. 
Third, the potential commercial success having been perceived, it is 
likely that efforts were made [by a number of firms] to develop the 
improvement. Fourth, the efforts having been made by men of skill in 
the art, they failed because the patentee was the first to reduce his 
development to practice.262 
Moreover, Kitch showed that commercial success may point in the opposite 
direction. If a product would be commercially successful, there may be less 
need for a patent to induce its creation.263 “At the very least,” he argues, “these 
two arguments should cancel each other and leave commercial success with no 
role to play in a non-obviousness inquiry.”264 
The reason that commercial success seems to produce equivocal results is 
that we are interested in the ratio of the private benefit provided by a successful 
experiment in the absence of the patent system to the cost of 
 
258.  Kitch, supra note 163. 
259.  Kitch, supra note 12, at 332-34. 
260.  “Since it is unlikely that patents that are not commercially successful will be brought to 
litigation, [considering commercial success] amounts to a suggestion that borderline cases 
be decided in favor of patentees.” Id. at 333. 
261.  Kitch, supra note 163, at 283. 
262.  Kitch, supra note 12, at 332. 
263.  Id. at 333-34. 
264.  Id. at 334. 
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experimentation.265 Actual commercial success provides some evidence that the 
expected degree of commercial success was high. That has two alternative 
implications. First, the nonpatent private benefit of successful experimentation 
may have been relatively high, tending toward obviousness. Second, there 
must have been either a great deal of experimentation (the inferential link that 
Kitch considers) or a low probability of success, tending either way toward 
nonobviousness. Our approach therefore provides support for Kitch’s 
observation that the effects may crudely cancel out. 
Commercial success thus seems intimately related to nonobviousness, but 
the relationship between them is not as simple as the current emphasis on 
commercial success in patent litigation would suggest. To unravel the puzzle of 
how to interpret commercial success evidence, we must consider not just the 
perspective of an individual inventor or firm but also market dynamics. Under 
stable conditions, the total combined economic effort of all firms racing for a 
particular invention will be equal to the present discounted value of the patent 
right. Each firm must consider not only whether experimentation will be 
successful but also what its probability is of winning the patent. Thus, where 
technology and markets develop roughly as expected, firms will earn on 
average zero economic profit.266 Where racing firms collectively earn large 
positive profits, something unexpected has occurred, and to determine the 
implications of that commercial success we must figure out the nature of the 
deviation from stable economic conditions. 
To make commercial success relevant in the secondary considerations 
analysis, we must thus define clearly what type of success is relevant. What is 
relevant is the level of commercial success, taking into account the investments 
of both the inventor and all other racing firms, relative to expectations once 
sufficient information existed to justify (at least to the inventor) technological 
research and commercialization conditional on research success. Unexpectedly 
high commercial success defined in this way implies patent inducement and 
nonobviousness, while unexpected low commercial success implies the 
opposite. These implications, however, are relatively weak. Even where 
commercial success is high relative to expectations, for example, it might be 
that the expected level of commercial success was still large enough that 
development would have occurred even without a patent incentive. Indeed, if 
other firms independently invented, did not seek patent protection, and yet 
also enjoyed commercial success, the evidence of success should probably be 
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viewed as demonstrating obviousness because such evidence shows that other 
firms did not need the patent inducement to invent. 
The evidence of unexpected commercial success that may thus be most 
relevant is evidence about the difficulty of obtaining funding for a research 
project. Suppose that a particular approach to research, which would be ready 
for commercialization if successful, was a marginal prospect for investors, so at 
the time of the initial investment, it was a close call as to whether any firm 
interested in pursuing this approach would be funded. The research eventually 
results, however, in a commercialized product for which a patent would be 
valuable. There is then a strong likelihood that if the patent incentive had not 
existed, the research and development would not have occurred. At times, 
relatively objective evidence of this, such as rejections from venture capitalists 
or memoranda indicating considerable skepticism within an organization about 
a particular approach, may be available, and such evidence could even be made 
available to patent examiners. Strong evidence of interest among potential 
funders may be more equivocal because it may be difficult to determine 
whether adequate interest would have existed absent the patent incentive. 
c. Considerations of Obviousness 
Unexpected commercial success, like the other secondary considerations 
that the courts have considered, thus may provide evidence of nonobviousness. 
Perhaps the absence of the secondary considerations provides some indirect 
evidence of obviousness, but it is also possible to devise secondary 
considerations that provide direct evidence of obviousness, consistent with the 
model we developed in Part II. These considerations become apparent when 
considering why an invention would not have been invented earlier if it was 
obvious. There are at least two possibilities. First, the cost of invention may 
have fallen rapidly. For example, if an invention depends on a research tool 
that did not exist until shortly before the research leading to the invention, the 
invention could not have been invented earlier. Similarly, an improvement 
patent cannot be invented before the patent that it is improving. Second, the 
benefits of invention may have risen rapidly. For example, the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks increased demand for security-related products, so the fact that a patent 
serving this demand was not invented earlier does not show nonobviousness. 
Such a recently felt need is the reverse of the long-felt need that can be a 
secondary consideration of nonobviousness. Another example can be found in 
Honeywell International v. United States.267 The disputed patent claim element in 
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that case involved filtering part of the red-color band for night vision goggles, 
and the patent issued just as the government was deciding that filtering this 
color band would be useful for night vision goggles to be used by pilots flying 
fixed-wing aircraft. 
The occurrence of an exogenous shock that decreases the cost of an 
invention or increases the benefit of an invention should count as a secondary 
consideration of obviousness. As with other secondary considerations, it cannot 
by itself resolve the issue. It is certainly possible, for example, that an 
improvement patent following closely after the original patent would not have 
been invented for a long time after the original absent patent incentives, and it 
should then count as nonobvious. But including such an exogenous shock as a 
secondary consideration will serve as a reminder to the decisionmaker that 
there is a possible reason for the failure of earlier invention. At least, it will 
avoid the danger that a decisionmaker will make the mistake of concluding that 
an invention is nonobvious because of the newness of the context. 
Furthermore, it will remind patent examiners to be especially vigilant in 
considering patent applications that follow major shocks. Such a secondary 
consideration might well have thinned the avalanche of patent applications that 
followed the development of the Internet. 
The occurrence of near-simultaneous independent invention by a party that 
was not itself motivated by patents should also count as a strong secondary 
consideration of obviousness. Independent invention itself is equivocal because 
it could simply indicate the existence of a patent race.268 But where one party 
does not seek a patent and it appears that this failure to seek a patent is not 
simply a strategic gambit to deny the other party a patent, such evidence 
strongly suggests that a patent incentive was not needed to motivate the 
invention. For example, if an independent software programmer at a company 
that had a policy of never seeking patents developed a process at about the 
same time as a software company that sought to patent the process, it should 
be difficult for the latter to obtain a patent even if it was the first to invent. An 
important caveat is that if the independent inventor planned to keep the 
invention as a trade secret, such should not preclude patenting because the 
Graham test seeks to identify inventions that would not be “devised or 
disclosed” absent the patent system. 
It may also be relevant, but far from dispositive, that there is a vibrant 
group of inventors working in the general area of the invention without 
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seeking patents. Sometimes, this might suggest that, even absent the patent 
incentive, someone else would have developed the invention soon. For 
example, if an international open science consortium plans to sequence 
genomes from a number of species, the fact that a patent-induced inventor is 
able to sequence a genome first might not be enough to entitle that inventor to 
a patent. On the other hand, because there are so many plausible targets of 
investigation in the pharmaceutical field, the existence of some number of open 
source researchers is probably largely irrelevant, unless there is reason to 
believe they are near resolution of any particular problem. The vast majority of 
such research is likely to be patent-induced, even if there are some who eschew 
patents and many for whom patents are a significant incentive along with other 
incentives, such as the desire to obtain government grants. 
conclusion 
We can conceptualize the inducement standard of patentability in at least 
three ways. The first is as a theoretical benchmark for evaluating 
nonobviousness determinations, but one so far removed from doctrine and 
practice as to be useless as a guide to the patent agency and the courts. We have 
argued for a second view: the inducement standard should directly influence 
the courts’ continued common law development of the obviousness doctrine, 
and the standard may provide useful guidance in determining the patentability 
of individual inventions. Once nonobviousness is framed in economic rather 
than cognitive terms, the inducement standard becomes comprehensible and 
administrable within the existing doctrinal framework. So far, we have ignored 
a third approach—the application of the inducement standard on a macro level 
rather than a micro level to foreclose patenting to entire classes of inventions 
that, on average, seem unlikely to be patent-induced.269 
At oral argument in a recent case on whether the entire class of business 
methods should be excluded from patentable subject matter, Justice Breyer 
suggested such an approach. “I don’t know whether across the board or in this 
area or that area patent protection will do no harm or more harm than good,” 
Breyer stated.270 Patent law, Breyer noted, induces inventors “to produce more” 
 
269.  For an article arguing the legal categories of the patentable subject matter doctrine should be 
restricted to exclude protection for “self-realizing” inventions, that is, those that would be 
developed even absent a patent incentive, see Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing 
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and “to disclose,”271 but it has two costs. The inventors will “charge a higher 
price, so people use the product less,”272 and the property rights will create 
transactions costs.273 Breyer suggested that the outcome of the case should turn 
on whether business methods as a class need the inducement of patents to 
generate innovation, and that view was directly expressed in the concurring 
opinion that Breyer joined.274 But if the inducement standard can be properly 
applied, Breyer’s two minuses can be explicitly balanced against the benefits 
associated with acceleration of invention. And if one insists on acceleration by 
at least the length of the patent term, the minuses disappear altogether. There 
will be errors, of course, in applying any approach, but the inducement 
standard can work sufficiently well that the courts need not use the much 
blunter instrument of restricting patentable subject matter. A majority of the 
Supreme Court disagreed with Justice Breyer’s macro-level embrace of the 
inducement standard, refusing to impose a categorical ban on business method 
patents.275 Whatever the correctness of that decision, it makes it all the more 
important for the Supreme Court and lower courts to accomplish the Graham 
Court’s goal of granting patents only to “those inventions which would not be 
disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a patent.”276 
The inducement standard would likely invalidate a relatively high 
percentage of patents in precisely those areas where patentable subject matter 
has become most controversial: business methods, software, and financial 
instruments.277 Two characteristics that these areas share are that many 
(though not all) innovations can be generated at lower cost and that there tend 
to be other incentives to innovate even in the absence of patents. Inventors in 
these areas do not wear lab coats, and innovation seems likely to require less 
experimentation of a more traditional scientific kind (which is frequently very 
expensive) and more intellectual experimentation (which may not be very 
expensive). The inducement standard easily accommodates such intellectual 
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experimentation, asking whether it would make sense to engage in the research 
process that produced a particular business method, software, or financial 
invention in the absence of a patent system. But in abandoning a cognitive 
approach, the inducement standard avoids the risk that a decisionmaker will 
conclude that because a complex and creative thought process was needed to 
arrive at the ultimate invention, the invention is by definition nonobvious. 
Moreover, it may be particularly easy to craft a speculative patent in these 
fields, for example by anticipating a type of business or software tool that will 
be useful in the future, and the inducement standard shows why these are 
invalid. By identifying the relevant baseline, which in the case of software 
includes the protections of copyright law, the inducement standard insists that 
inventions that would be routinely created not receive patent protection. But it 
does so in a much more nuanced way than a categorical ban, allowing the 
inducement standard also to improve decisionmaking in less controversial 
areas of patenting. 
